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Abstract
SOFTWARE FOR EFFICIENT FILE ELIMINATION
IN COMPUTER FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS
by Chad Werner Davis

Computer forensics investigators, much more than with any other forensic
discipline, must process an ever continuing increase of data. Fortunately, computer
processing speed has kept pace and new processes are continuously being automated to
sort through the voluminous amount of data. There exists an unfulfilled need for a
simple, streamlined, standalone public tool for automating the computer forensics
analysis process for files on a hard disk drive under investigation. A software tool has
been developed to dramatically reduce the number of files that an investigator must
individually examine. This tool utilizes the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) database to
automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files on the hard drive under
investigation to "known good" files (e.g., unaltered application files) and "known bad"
files (e.g., exploits). This tool then provides a much smaller list of “unknown” files to be
closely examined.
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction to Forensic Science
When most people hear the term forensics, they immediately relate to one of the
many dramas currently on television that explicitly deal with the adventures of police
forensic technicians such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation. For example, an episode
may depict police investigators taking numerous photographs while gathering
fingerprints and blood and hair samples at the scene of a murder on Fremont Street in Las
Vegas. A crime has transpired and the duty of the law enforcement agency is to collect
evidence, identify a suspect, and assemble a solid case against the alleged perpetrator.
These television dramas have become popular due to America’s growing fascination in
the field of forensics.

Forensics is the application of science and technology in a civil or criminal
investigation to preserve, extract, analyze, and document various items with the aim of
producing potentially evidentiary material. “Some crime-history experts place the origins
of forensic science in early writings on forensic medicine; a Chinese work titled The
Washing Away of Sins, published in about 1250, described ways to distinguish between
accidental death and murder” [1]. For many common crimes, the methodologies and
challenges to solving mysteries are familiar—a time-tested process as old as the legal
system itself. The criminal investigator must first ascertain a motive, means, and
opportunity for an alleged perpetrator of a crime before the case can be tried in court to
obtain a conviction. Throughout the last two centuries, the field of forensics has
developed upon its solid scientific foundation and expanded significantly to encompass
-1-

many diverse areas including pathology, fingerprint identification, document analysis,
ballistics, and even analysis of computer evidence.

1.2 Introduction to Computer Forensics
Rapidly changing technology and expansion in communications and information
exchange within corporations and even our own homes has made our world smaller.
“America is substantially more invested in information processing and management than
manufacturing goods, and this has affected our professional and personal lives” [2]. The
market for computer technology is driven by the demand for new and enhanced features.
Consequently, functionality and cost, not security, are chief considerations in its design.
Computer usage has become ubiquitous and commonplace, and misuse of instant
messaging and email communications, file downloading, online banking, and other
mundane Internet technologies now pose potential criminal threats to a computer system.

As America has shifted from the production of manufacturing goods to reliance
upon the accurate function of information processing systems, modern criminals have
also to a large extent made the transition into the cyber world. More and more, these
criminals are both utilizing and targeting computer systems. Electronic trails, such as
evidence left by criminals who manipulate data, have replaced paper trails. A suspect’s
notebook or diary of yesterday may today take the form of a file existing on a floppy disk
or hard drive. Crimes involving violence and theft are not impervious to the effects of
the information age. The world is gravely cognizant of terrorist attacks in a physical
sense such as the plane hijackings which occurred on 9/11. However, we must also
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recognize that an equally serious and costly terrorist attack could come from the Internet
in the form of a denial of service attack, email bomb, or computer virus.

Computer forensics, one of the newest subsets under forensic investigation,
“involves the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, and interpretation of
computer data” [3]. Crimes related to technology may seem novel, but their character
remains analogous to other crimes. The motivations of criminals remain consistent;
however, their methods do change in relation to advancing technology. New tools are
constantly emerging to aid criminals in the commission of their crimes on the Internet.
Such utilities steal credit card numbers and other personal information, crack passwords,
and deny access to web servers.

In response, the requirements of law enforcement agencies and the regulatory
environment are continually evolving. The techniques used by investigators to examine
these crimes also change. New security tools are continually being developed to counter
the threats posed by modern criminals.

Figure 1 and Table 1 below depict the dramatic rise in the number of incidents
reported to the CERT Coordination Center, a major reporting center for Internet security
problems, within the past fifteen years [4].
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Figure 1: Number of Incidents Reported to the CERT Coordination Center, 1988-2003
(Source: CERT Coordination Center)

Year
Incidents

1988
6

1989
132

1990
252

1991
406

1992
773

1993
1,334

1994
2,340

1995
2,412

Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Incidents 2,573 2,134 3,734 9,859 21,756 52,658 82,094 137,529
Table 1: Number of Incidents Reported to the CERT Coordination Center, 1988-2003
(Source: CERT Coordination Center)

The field of computer forensics is very demanding. Digital evidence is extremely
volatile and special precautions must be taken to preserve its integrity. Explaining the
technical aspects of an investigation may prove challenging in a court of law, since many
potential jurors are unfamiliar not only with computer forensics, but also with computers
themselves.
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Computer forensics specialists must couple their own flexibility and creativity
when encountering the uncommon with attention to detail in following precise,
established methodologies and procedures. Legal precedent offers considerable direction
in court cases within common-law countries such as the United States. However, the
dynamic nature of computer crime frequently involves untested issues and cyber lawyers
must deal with relatively more ambiguity than do many of their fellow legal counterparts.

In the example of the murder on Fremont Street in Las Vegas, the crime scene
would be photographed, investigators would search for evidence, and they would acquire
various samples such as blood and hair. In computer forensics investigations, evidence is
gathered in a similar fashion; however, it is frequently desired that the entire system be
recreated in the courtroom. Of course, no one would demand that the prosecution
recreate all of Fremont Street at a trial proceeding, but in a computer crime case, that is
often the expectation.

Computer forensics investigation is not a suitable field for the complacent.
However, it is an exciting career for those highly motivated individuals who desire steady
challenge and self-development through their own flexibility and continuous learning.

1.3 Justification for Research
Computer forensics investigators, much more than with any other forensic
discipline, must process an ever continuing increase of data. The personal computer
revolution in the early 1980s ushered in the introduction of the first hard disk drives.
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These 5.25-inch hard disk drives held approximately five to ten Megabytes of data—or
roughly 2,500 to 5,000 double-spaced pages of information. At the time, any size over
ten Megabytes of storage was viewed as too large for a "personal" computer. By
contrast, it is commonplace for today’s ordinary home computer systems to feature hard
disk drives ranging anywhere between twenty and two hundred Gigabytes of data
space—the equivalent of 10,240,000 to 102,400,000 double-spaced pages of information.

“Applied to forensic pathology, this is the equivalent of on average having two
bodies to process twenty years ago, and today on average having about eighty thousand
corpses to examine in each and every crime scene” [5]. While such an undertaking
would be infeasible in forensic pathology, it is the stark reality in computer forensics.
Fortunately, computer processing speed has kept pace and new processes are
continuously being automated to sort through the voluminous amount of data. Table 2
below shows the number of files typically installed by todays widely used operating
systems and applications:

Operating System / Applications
Files Installed
Virgin Windows 98
4,266
Virgin Windows NT 4 Workstation
1,659
Virgin Windows 2000 Professional Edition
5,963
Virgin Windows ME
5,169
Windows 98 + Office 2000
23,464
Windows ME + Office 2000
24,124
Table 2: Amount of Files Typically Installed by Operating Systems and Applications
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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1.4 Background: Other Published Work
Computer forensics is a relatively new field, and the use of automated processes
in the examination of files on a suspect hard drive is even newer. In fact, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library
(NSRL) Reference Data Set (RDS), an extensive database of known file information that
can be utilized by these automated processes, was first distributed in 2001.

An exhaustive literature review only produced two relevant research papers. The
first is a thesis, written in 2002 by Tye Brown Stallard at the University of California,
Davis, which deals with automated text analysis within files to assist in computer
forensics investigations [6]. In this paper, Stallard points out that “computer forensics
analysts are swamped in evidence because of the large volume of data encountered, the
dearth of trained investigators, and the lack of automated techniques to analyze computer
crime data.” Stallard makes a short reference to the NIST NSRL, but does not go into
depth on the topic, nor implement it within his project.

The second article is a final paper written by Simson L. Garfinkel at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003 [7]. This short paper proposes the notion
for developing a framework by which a database of cryptographic hash values for files
could be collected, searched, and replicated via a web interface. These files and
corresponding hash values would be considered for evaluation under three categories:
known good, known bad, and unknown. The known good files would exist as
unmodified system files, applications, etc. The known bad files would exist as Trojan
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horses, widely distributed pornography, or other malicious or illicit files. The known
good and known bad files would not need examination by the forensic investigator, since
they would be automatically disregarded and categorized as evidence. The unknown files
would need close investigation by the computer forensics analyst.

1.5 Other Software Available
1.5.1 Known Goods
There are currently a few web services on the Internet that deal with databases of
known files and their corresponding hash values. The first example of such a service is
Known Goods, located online at http://www.knowngoods.org [8]. Brian Wotring of the
Shmoo Group created known Goods in 2002 as a way for developers and end users to
quickly determine whether or not a file has been modified since it was first installed from
its distribution. The hash sets are available either for download or directly from the web
service to anyone who wishes to use it free of charge. Unfortunately, the database
currently only contains information for executables written for the Linux (i386),
FreeBSD (i386), Mac OS X, Mac OS X Server, and Solaris operating systems. The
service’s website states that it is “not the authoritative source for checksums on files,” but
simply a tool that can be used to verify a questionable file by comparing its hash value
with the one on record in the database of known good files.

1.5.2 HashKeeper
Another online service is HashKeeper, located on the Internet at
http://www.hashkeeper.org [9]. This service was created in 1997 by the United States
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Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center for use by any state, local or
federal law enforcement entity. HashKeeper is distributed as a run-time Microsoft
Access database application that implements the Message Digest 5 (MD5) file signature
algorithm to establish hash sets for known files. The application compares those known
hash values against the hash values of unknown files on a seized computer system.
HashKeeper then categorizes hash values as authenticated (known good), authenticated
and notable (known bad), or unauthenticated (unknown) and subsequently groups
individual related hash values into hash sets. A forensics investigator can then determine
with a degree of statistical certainty that files on a seized hard disk drive matching the
database of known hash values do not need to be closely examined. Unfortunately, this
online service has been down since May 2002 but their website promises a new and
improved service in the near future.

1.5.3 EnCase
There are also integrated suites of computer forensics utilities available to
investigators. An example of one of these suites is EnCase, written and distributed by
Guidance Software [10]. This utility incorporates over fifteen tools such as disk imaging,
deleted file recovery, and analysis of slack space on a disk drive. In addition, EnCase
compares known file signatures, or hash values, with suspect files so that investigators
can determine whether the alleged perpetrator has modified the data within files in order
to hide evidence from detection. EnCase, used by thousands of law-enforcement
agencies around the world, can also be purchased for use by educational institutions and
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corporations. The drawback for using EnCase is its hefty price tag: $1,995.00 for
education and government institutions, and $2,495.00 for corporations.

1.5.4 ILook Investigator
Another computer forensics suite is ILook Investigator, which was originally
written by Elliot Spencer [11]. Spencer later partnered with the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service, Criminal Investigation Division, Electronic Crimes Program and today this
comprehensive disk analysis tool is made available at no charge, but only to “qualifying
law enforcement agencies throughout the world.” Although this comprehensive forensics
suite could prove useful to private industry applications, it is not available to them.
ILook Investigator utilizes hash values from both the HashKeeper and NIST NSRL
databases. ILook Investigator supports numerous FAT, NTFS, Mac, Linux, SCO, Novell
Netware, and CD file systems and their variants.

1.5.5 Unix-based Tools
Individual utilities used for hashing files and verifying their validity to a database
of known hash values exist primarily as Unix-based solutions. Two examples of these
utilities are The Sleuth Kit [12] and HashDig [13]. The Sleuth Kit is an open source set
of separate utilities that may be used together in the forensic investigation of FAT, NTFS,
EXTxFS, and FFS file systems. Hfind is a utility within The Sleuth Kit that implements
a binary sort algorithm to look up hashes within the NIST NSRL, HashKeeper, and
custom hash databases created by the MD5 hashing algorithm. HashDig is an open
source utility designed to automate the process of creating MD5 hash values for files on a
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suspect computer system, comparing these values with the known values in the NIST
NSRL, HashKeeper, KnownGoods, Sun’s Solaris Fingerprint Database, or any custom
built database, and placing each file in either a category of known files and unknown
files. Unfortunately, most of these Unix-based programs require the investigator to write
complex scripts and work purely within a command line interface. The generated output
is usually created within comma separated text files that require the use of another
program such as a spreadsheet application to view the output in an easy to read format.

1.6 Problem Statement
A review of previously published work indicates that although the notion of hash
filtering has exploded, there are several concerns with existing software used to compare
hash values on a suspect machine with a database of known hash values. These concerns
include that the software is either packaged within a forensics suite, too expensive, too
hard to use, or otherwise unavailable for use by the general public or most small law
enforcement agencies. There exists an unfulfilled need for a simple, streamlined,
standalone public tool for automating the computer forensic investigative process for files
on a disk.

It is proposed that a software tool be designed to automate the analysis of a hard
drive under investigation and thus dramatically reduce the number of files that an
investigator must individually examine. This tool will utilize the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL)
database to automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files to “known

- 11 -

good” files (e.g., unaltered application files) and “known bad” files (e.g., exploits). This
tool will provide a much smaller list of files to be closely examined.

1.7 Organization of This Work
This research is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the subject
matter and context into which this thesis fits. Forensic science, specifically the field of
computer forensics is presented along with justifications for the research. Previous work
in the form of published articles and other available software provides background
information on the subject matter. Chapter 2 presents a general overview of the computer
forensics methodologies and the investigative process: acquiring, authenticating, and
analyzing evidence. Special emphasis is also placed on proper identification, collection,
handling, transportation, storage, and backing up of the evidence, as well as chain of
custody, documenting the investigation, and preservation and presentation of evidence in
a court of law. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to cryptographic hash functions,
including their goals and classifications, and overall design structure. An overview of
popular hash functions such as MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 is given. A technical description
of the MD5 hash algorithm is presented, with analysis of its security from attack and
advantages over other algorithms. Chapter 4 provides information about the need for,
and construction of, the NIST NSRL and its RDS. This chapter provides examples of
how the RDS can be used in computer forensics investigations. Detailed technical
information is given about data elements and record structures of the RDS. Also, the
effectiveness of the RDS hash sets is examined. Chapter 5, the core of this research,
presents the methodology and design for building a prototype software application
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written to substantiate this research. This technical walkthrough details how the software
application prepares data from the RDS distribution, searches for files and calculates their
corresponding hash values, and then compares those hashes with the RDS. Also, the
ability to save logs and view files in a hex editor and other views are demonstrated.
Chapter 6 provides analysis and implications of this research, including several tests to
ensure the software application is both efficient and effective. Recommendations for
future work and final conclusions are also presented.
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Chapter 2
2.1 Foundations of Computer Forensics Investigations
Computer systems have proliferated society and our business world. It is not
surprising that they are both a tool for committing, and the object of, crime. These
crimes are varied and include unauthorized use such as stealing a username and
password, creating or releasing a malicious computer program such as a worm or virus,
harassment and stalking, identity theft, email abuse, pornography, fraud, and theft of
proprietary information and intellectual property. All of these computer-related crimes
leave digital tracks. These tracks can provide evidence that an alleged perpetrator did or
did not commit the suspected crime.

When computers are suspected of being used to commit a crime, investigations
usually include examining log files to see what occurred and searching through gigabytes
of data to look for specific keywords related to the crime being investigated. When
computers are the object of a crime, the systems that were remotely attacked are
examined. This procedure is known as incident response. Remote attacks originated
over the Internet are rapidly increasing in both frequency and sophistication as network
services become more complex, and more vulnerable. As the sophistication of computer
technology increases so does the need to anticipate and guard against a corresponding
rise in computer related criminal activity.
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Computer forensics investigators must exercise due diligence and care while
following strict guidelines and procedures, approaching the computer as evidence from
the very start. Each investigation must be treated as if it will eventually end up in a court
of law. For example, the CERT Coordination Center has produced a report explaining
how the Federal Bureau of Investigation gathers evidence within their investigations [14]:
“Preserve the state of the computer at the time of the incident by making a
backup copy of logs, damaged or altered files, and files left by the intruder. If the
incident is in progress, activate auditing software and consider implementing a
keystroke monitoring program if the system log on the warning banner permits.”

Even if the investigator reasonably believes that the situation does not call for a
forensic analysis initially, it is imperative that he or she completely document what steps
were taken. It is possible that the investigator will later discover a criminal act was
indeed committed, and this evidence may still be defensible if the documentation can
demonstrate in court that the investigator initially had no reason to suspect the computer
was involved in a crime and it was later discovered during routine troubleshooting.
Timely and thorough documentation, as well as proper evidence handling, are keys to an
investigation and possible litigation. The evidence must meet the legal standard for
admission at trial, but even then the defense will attempt to weaken the incriminating
evidence or have it thrown out altogether. “Possible challenges include questions about
reliability and irregularities, inconsistencies and vulnerability to manipulation” [15].
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Evidence can be discovered on a wide variety of devices and drives. Floppy, zip,
and jazz disks, CDs, DVDs, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives, and thumb drives are just a
few examples. Incriminating data may exist inside emails, text documents, images,
temporary, system, and swap files, and the system’s cache. Evidence may even reside
within hidden, deleted, formatted, or partially overwritten areas on the storage medium.
Recovering and analyzing such data (i.e., what was done to a file and when it was done)
can help the investigator understand what the suspect was attempting to do and whether
or not he or she is innocent or guilty.

Goals of a computer forensics investigation are not limited to determining
whether a breach occurred, and if so, establishing who the offender was, and then
successfully prosecuting the offender if the breach involved criminal activity. Forensics
may also be used to determine the main cause of an event to ensure it will not happen
again. To be successful, the investigator must fully understand the extent of the problem
and how to respond to it. If the analysis is not complete and the extent of the intrusion or
compromise is not found then the problem will only be compounded.
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Although there are newer computer forensic techniques suitable for rapidly changing
technology, the basic methodology remains the same. The details will vary depending on
the circumstances and the investigator’s goals, but the basic methodology can be broken
down into three key elements [3]:
1. Acquire the evidence without altering or damaging the original.
2. Authenticate that your recovered evidence is the same as the original.
3. Analyze the evidence without modifying it.

The scope of this research lies within the third stage of a forensics investigation. As a
foundation to the reader, each of these three basic elements will now be examined in
greater detail.

2.2 Step 1: Acquire the Evidence
Evidence must be obtained without altering or damaging the original data.
However, computer forensics involves many unknowns and much uncertainty, and no
two investigations are exactly the same. For example, there is no guarantee that the
suspect computer can be powered off without the loss or corruption of data, booted off a
floppy disk or bootable CD, or successfully mirrored for analysis. The investigator must
encounter the unknowns, and carefully think and adapt strict investigative procedures to
the particular situation at hand. He or she must make sure to act in ways that can be
easily explained later, and diligently document all of his or her actions without fail.
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There are disagreements among computer forensic investigators about whether to
let a computer continue to run, to pull the power plug from the computer, or to perform
the normal shutdown process during an investigation. Some argue that the only way to
freeze the computer at its current state, examine a copy of the original data, and maintain
the most defensible evidence, is to pull the plug. However, this is not always practical or
politically acceptable, especially if the system will be shut down for a long or indefinite
period of time.

Others argue that pulling the plug will result in the loss of any data associated
with an attack in process, and it may corrupt data on the hard drive. “In some situations,
especially Internet intrusions, the evidence may be found only in RAM and disconnecting
or turning off the computer before capturing an image of the computer will destroy what
little evidence exists” [3]. If the system has hostile code, or malware, running on it, then
data may become lost or corrupted if the system is powered down. Unfortunately, the
investigator may not immediately be able to tell whether or not such code is running.

However, if an investigator makes a mistake on a live system during an
investigation, he or she cannot simply click the undo button; pulling the plug may be
valid because it will allow time to prepare an action plan and perform a forensic backup
of the suspect media.

Using forensic utilities that reside on a compromised system to examine that
system may not yield reliable or accurate results about its true state. A perpetrator may
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anticipate a live system investigation and alter some of the files within the computer’s
operating system. Again, every case is different, and a contingency approach must be
applied. Keep in mind that if the investigator is not rigorous right from the beginning,
and the case is prosecuted, what’s done is done, and there is no way to go back and
recover what has been lost or compromised.

2.2.1 Handling the Evidence
As previously stated, the investigator must exercise great care in handling the
evidence right from the start. Proper storage and transportation are particularly critical.
Otherwise, the evidence could be compromised and the chance for successful prosecution
of any resulting case could be lost. This paper will discuss the initial collection of
evidence as well as its later surrender to law enforcement or the victim.

2.2.1.1 Chain of Custody
“The chain of custody is a process used to maintain and document the
chronological history of the evidence” [16]. This process must track all persons who had
custody of and responsibility for the evidence from its initial acquisition until its final
disposition. Documentation should also include:


Agency and case number



Victim’s and/or suspect’s name



Brief description of the item



Who collected it



How and where it was collected
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How it was stored and protected in storage



Each person or entity who subsequently took possession of it



Why each person or entity was in possession of it



Dates and times the items were collected, transferred, and returned

It is imperative to maintain the integrity of the evidence and limit access to it.
Defense attorneys will look for discrepancies and gaps in the records, seek to show a
break in the chain of custody, create reasonable doubt that the evidence was not properly
safeguarded, and try to argue the evidence was tampered with. Without the chain of
custody, the evidence may not be admissible in court.

Record keeping can consist of either receipt and voucher type forms, or a simpler
spreadsheet application. The key is to be thorough and consistent and ensure that no
information is missing. It is also beneficial to select an evidence custodian who is
available to receive and release evidence and attend to all record keeping.

2.2.1.2 Identifying the Evidence
Every item of evidence must be identified, labeled, counted, and cataloged.
Evidence should be collected under dual control, and in large scale investigations a
custodian should be assigned to help coordinate and control the effort and ensure that
evidence is properly accounted for at all times. Useful tools in this stage include a laptop
computer, a portable printer, and a label maker or even handwritten tags. The evidence
custodian should complete the evidence log and print labels for identification of the
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evidence. Electronic logs, forms, and reports can be programmed using software to cross
reference and automatically fill in identical information, reducing errors and saving time.
This software often includes header information that will automatically appear on each
form associated with a particular case. Each label should include [3]:


The case number



A brief description



The investigator’s and/or custodian’s signature



The date and time the evidence was collected

The investigator should also photograph the entire crime scene to document the
environment. Pictures should also be taken of both the front and the back of the suspect
computer, including a picture of the screen, while it is still connected to its cables, if
possible. Serial numbers should also be photographed and logged. The condition and
state (on, off, screen locked, etc,) of the computer system upon arrival should also be
documented.

All evidence and information pertaining to a particular incident, including
photographs, storage media, papers, reports, etc., should be stored together in a closeable
file folder. The folder should be clearly labeled with the header information (e.g., case or
incident number, location, brief description, etc.).
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2.2.1.3 Collecting the Evidence
Successful conviction depends upon collecting complete, clear, accurate,
convincing, and admissible proof that the accused person is guilty. It is important to be
thorough in collecting data. Evidence, such as media files or scraps of paper, that is left
behind at the scene may not be available later. This is especially true for log files, which
may be routinely overwritten in short periods of time (even minutes), depending on the
system producing the logs. Similarly, Internet Service Providers usually keep logs for
thirty days or less as a manner of standard practice due to the high storage costs and low
benefits involved, and the investigator must act quickly to preserve the evidence.

There are many sources of evidence. Swap files, which are spaces in the hard
disk set aside by the operating system to be temporarily accessed when more memory is
needed, may include recently copied files and passwords. Temporary files, which are
created by Windows in case the operating system crashes, include information about
open files. The system registry may contain information about what hardware is
attached, user information such as recently browsed web pages, and software installation
information such as serial numbers and passwords. Even deleted files, which actually
remain on the hard drive for a period of time until they are overwritten, can produce
potentially incriminating evidence. Other sources include network backups and emails.

2.2.1.4 Transporting the Evidence
Care must also be taken in the transportation of electronic evidence. For example,
hard drives can be damaged if they come into contact with magnetic fields or if the read-
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write heads come in contact with the platter; in both cases, evidence can be lost because
data can no longer be read off the disk. Laptops and personal digital assistants can also
be easily damaged if not handled properly. Packaging used to protect the evidence
should be static-free to prevent damage.

When the packaging is closed, it should be closed with a tamper-evident seal, and
a signature of someone authorized to open it should be written across the seal. Doing so
will indicate if someone other than the authorized person opens it later. If, at some point
during the investigation it becomes necessary to open the sealed container, document the
following information [3]:


Whether the initial seal was intact



Why it was necessary to unseal the container



Dates and times the evidence was both removed from and returned to storage



Who had custody of the evidence



What was done to the evidence

Reseal the evidence inside a second container with a new label with signature, so that the
original broken seal is preserved, and return it to storage.

2.2.1.5 Storing the Evidence
Both the physical aspect and integrity of electronic evidence must continue to be
protected in the storage phase. Evidence must be stored in an environment that is cool,
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clean, and dry. It must be in sealed containers, and in a secure area with limited access
which is controlled and logged by a designated custodian.

2.2.2 Creating a Forensic Backup
The forensic analysis should always be performed on an exact bit-for-bit (or bit
stream) replica of the original media, if possible, and not the original storage medium. A
bit stream image is different than a standard backup because it copies deleted files and
the other parts of a hard drive that a computer forensics investigator would want to
examine for evidence. Examining a copy will help protect the original data or evidence.
If a mistake is made and the data being analyzed is damaged, the copy can be erased and
the original image can be restored.

Many forensic investigators recommend making two backups of the original
drive—backing up the original drive to a hard drive, and using a tape drive to create a
second copy, using the second hard drive as the original this time (preferring to use the
original drive as little as possible). For example, a forensic drive cloning utility such as
SafeBack, available online at http://www.forensics-intl.com/safeback.html, can be used
to make the first original to second hard drive copy; this is generally the fastest and most
reliable way to collect and back up the original evidence [17]. The second drive-to-tape
copy is useful during the analysis for archiving and restoring the image as needed. The
investigator should make a file signature (MD5 or SHA-1 hash value) of the newly
created drive images before beginning the analysis and document it in his or her notes.

- 24 -

2.2.3 Documenting the Investigation
Without proper and extensive documentation of the forensic investigation
methodologies used and findings of the investigation it is nearly impossible to
successfully present and defend the findings in court. This is true, even in cases where
the investigator is very skilled technically. If the investigator lacks the necessary
documentation skills, it is imperative that he or she partner with someone who has them.
This person must be diligent to accurately and thoroughly document the investigation
process in its entirety, at each step along the way.

Documentation must include what actions were taken and why, and be detailed
with the software and version numbers of the software evidence, collection tools, and
methods used to collect and analyze the evidence. The investigator’s actions will be
challenged by the defense, and must be upheld as “reasonable.” Thorough and detailed
notes will serve as a written record and are invaluable. The investigator must never leave
these details to memory, especially since the case may not go to trial for some time,
perhaps several years.

2.3 Step 2: Authenticate the Evidence
The investigator must be able to authenticate that the evidence collected in the
investigation is the same as the data left behind by the criminal. This is a challenge for
many reasons. For example, evidence can be damaged over time by unfavorable
environmental conditions such as adverse temperatures, moisture, mold, and dust. The
investigator must be able to prove that the chain of custody and other rules for handling
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evidence where properly adhered to and that no unanticipated or introduced changes
occurred to assure the jury of its integrity.

If possible, create a hash of the entire drive and the individual files before
performing any analysis. Computer forensic specialists have proven the effectiveness of
cryptographic hashing algorithms as a way to verify the integrity of a sequence of data
bits. These algorithms verify the contents of the sequence have not been changed since
its collection.

“Hashing can authenticate electronic data and the software used to store and
maintain it. Two files with exactly the same bit patterns should hash to the same code
using the same hashing algorithm. If a hash for a file stays the same, there is only an
extremely minute probability that the file has been changed. On the other hand, if the
hashes for the files do not match, then the files are not the same.” [18]

Two algorithms commonly accepted for this purpose are MD5 (Message Digest
version 5) which creates a 128-bit signature, and SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) which
creates a 160-bit signature. MD5 is discussed in greater detail within the next chapter.
Increasingly, applications such as Tripwire, available online at www.tripwire.com [19],
are using multiple hash algorithms, so that if an attack is discovered against one
algorithm in the future, the data from the other algorithm will remain valid.

- 26 -

Timestamping the evidence can show that it did, in fact, exist at a particular point
in time. This is done by using cryptographic software, such as MD5 or SHA-1, to
calculate a hash value that serves as a digital fingerprint or signature. Creating and
recording a hash value at the time the data is initially collected will allow the investigator
to prove that the copies of the data used in the examination are identical to the original.

2.4 Step 3: Analysis
The investigator must analyze all data that might possibly be relevant without
modifying or damaging it, and continue to carefully preserve the evidence during this
phase. Once a forensic backup or bit stream copy of the original media has been made, it
should be used for all analysis. “The investigator should provide an opinion of the
system layout, the file structures discovered, any discovered data and authorship
information, any attempts to hide, delete, protect, or encrypt information, and anything
else that has been discovered and appears to be relevant to the case” [20].

Similarly, the chain of custody must continue to be preserved via detailed
documentation whenever evidence is removed or returned to the secure storage cabinet or
custodian as previously discussed. The basic and overriding principle is to not comprise
the original evidence by altering or damaging it. The investigator must also be careful to
operate within legal boundaries and not go beyond his or her own knowledge without
seeking qualified expert assistance as needed.
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Forensic investigators also disagree about whether to conduct the analysis within
a command-line operating system like DOS, or a graphical system like Windows,
although the trend is toward Windows. In either case, the investigator will need to be
proficient with a variety of program tools, since no one tool will do everything required
during the analysis.

The analysis should begin by first examining the partition table on the suspect
drive. It is important to document this information too, and it will also help determine
what software tools are supported and therefore can be utilized. Next, the investigator
should print a directory listing, including subdirectories, or save it to a file. The file can
then be opened into a spreadsheet or with a viewer and analyzed to look for specific data.

What is, or is not, found on the computer may give the investigator some clue as
to the suspect’s prowess. If the investigator discovers complex programs such as a
steganography utility (a tool used for secretly hiding data within other files), he or she
should be on the lookout for advanced attempts to conceal data. On the other hand,
finding only standard software does not mean the investigator can afford to relax his or
her guard.

The investigator can use a hex editor or a forensic program to view the master
boot record and the boot sector, look for bad clusters, and view them in hexadecimal
format. These utilities allow the investigator to read the raw information off of the
storage medium in both hexadecimal and ASCII format. The investigator should record

- 28 -

the cluster size and view the File Allocation Table (in the case of DOS/Windows 9x), or
Master File Table (in the case of Windows NT/2000/XP). The investigator should also
determine if any data is hidden in the bad blocks, especially if there is reason to believe
the suspect is a more skilled computer user, and hunt for keywords related to the case if
the hex editor or forensic program has a search capability.

Deleted files can be recovered manually using a hex editor, but this is slow and
tedious. Kruse and Heiser explain what happens to deleted files within the Windows
environment [3]:
“When a file is deleted in Windows, the first character of the directory
entry is changed to a sigma character, the hex value of E5. This indicates to the
operating system that this directory should not be displayed because the file has
been deleted. The entries in the File Allocation Table assigned to the deleted files
are changed to zero, indicating that the sectors they point to are unused and
available to the operating system for data storage. The operating system does not
do anything to the actual data until another file happens to be saved at the same
location, which is why the investigator may be able to find incriminating data that
the suspect thought he or she had deleted.”

Automated file retrieval software includes Norton UnErase, and Runtime’s
Software GetDataBack. If the file is fragmented, which is commonly the case; the
investigator must manually chain clusters together to make a complete file. Unallocated
and slack space, the area on a disk between the end of a file and the end of the cluster that

- 29 -

the file occupies, should also be checked for residual data. This can be done using
software tools specifically designed for this purpose.

Save copies of the evidence on the hard disk of the analysis workstation and
adjust the formatting as needed for legibility, presentation, and reporting purposes. This
will change the saved file’s properties, but remember: this is an electric transcript and not
the actual evidence. Copy only the relevant, incriminating portions of a file. Document
the logical position (page, row, and paragraph) where the data was found and where on
the drive the data was recovered (cylinder, head, and sector of the physical drive). The
investigator may also be called upon to unzip the retrieved files, searching for and
attempting to crack passwords. All removable media collected must all be analyzed as
well.

2.5 Preservation and Presentation in Court
Computer evidence is very fragile and it is susceptible to alteration or erasure. As
stated before, the investigator must accurately and thoroughly document the chain of
custody that accounts for the evidence at all times. He or she must all also store the
evidence in a way that it will not be damaged or tampered with in any way. Otherwise,
the evidence may not be admissible in court, and the case will be compromised.

Presentation in a court of law is one of the most critical steps in the investigator’s
case. The investigator must be able to explain to a judge and jury what steps were
performed and why the actions he or she took were reasonable. Carefully, completely,
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and consistently following the guidelines discussed in this chapter during each phase of
the investigation will go a very long way toward a successful presentation in court.

The fundamental process of computer forensics is to acquire, authenticate, and
analyze the evidence of an investigation. A balance of strict and disciplined adherence to
the rigorous standard procedures of evidence collection and custody, combined with
flexibility and out-of-the-box thinking in locating and analyzing the evidence are required
for a successful investigation.
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Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction to Cryptographic Hash Functions
The word hash means to “chop into small pieces” [21]. Cryptographic hash
functions are algorithms used in computer programming to create identifying values of
fixed length for data of arbitrary length either for accessing the data or for security
purposes such as data integrity and message authentication. These functions impose a
mathematical function (or a series of functions) on an input sequence of bits, such as a
text string, file, etc., and generating as output a value produced from the algorithm’s
influence on those data bits.

“Hashing algorithms fall within the realm of error detection techniques” [22].
Broadly speaking, the algorithm enables a receiver to determine if a message that has
been transmitted through a noisy, error-producing channel has been corrupted en route.
The receiver computes a hash value that is a function of the received message, and
compares it to the hash value of the original message. If the two hash values match, then
the message was received as intended; otherwise, the message has been changed.

From a computer forensics standpoint, hashing is an excellent method used to
authenticate a sequence of data bits and ensure the immutability of a file’s original
content. In this case “the hash value serves as a compact representative image (also
referred to as a digital fingerprint, digital signature, or message digest) of an input string,
and can be used as if it were uniquely identifiable with that string” [4].
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The cryptographic hash function is used to detect any change in the contents of a
file, either an accidental change or a change that was made on purpose. By generating a
value which serves as a “benchmark” or “fingerprint” for a file, the investigator can be
sure that the file has not changed if it is the same as the “known” hash value of the
original content.

Message digests are identical as long as they are generated for the same identical
file. However, if even one single bit is added (or otherwise changed) in the file, the
message digest is not only different, it is entirely different. The hash function ensures
that if a single bit of the input is altered in any way a bitwise inversion of roughly half of
the bits in the resulting cryptographic result. This is also known as the “avalanche effect”
[24]. The smallest amount of change will force the digital signature verification process
to fail, since each bit of the hash value depends upon each and every bit of the input. A
changed hash value does not tell you how different the changed file is, or what the
differences are; it just tells you that there is or is not a difference.

An example of how hash values can be applied to data integrity is given by
Menezes and Oorschot, and Vanstone [23]:
“The hash-value corresponding to a particular message x is computed at
time T1. The integrity of this hash-value (but not the message itself) is protected
in some manner. At a subsequent time T2, the following test is carried out to
determine whether the message has been altered, i.e., whether a message x’ is the
same as the original message. The hash-value of x’ is computed and compared to
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the protected hash-value; if they are equal, one accepts that the inputs are also
equal, and thus that the message has not been altered. The problem of preserving
the integrity of a potentially large message is thus reduced to that of a small fixedsize hash-value.”

Hash functions offer several advantages over encryption. Encryption is slower,
and encryption hardware is expensive and optimized to large data. “A digital signature or
integrity check can be computed by applying cryptographic processing to the document’s
hash value, which is small compared to the document itself. Also, a message digest can
be made public without revealing the contents of the document from which it is derived.
This is important in digital timestamping where, using hash functions, one can get a
document timestamped to establish that it existed on a certain date without revealing its
contents to the timestamping service” [25]. This is useful, for example, in the case of
copyright disputes.

Cryptographic hash codes can be extended for the use of determining the identity
of a file. “By computing the hash of a suspect file and then looking up that hash in a
database, it is possible to determine if that suspect file is a copy of a file that has
previously been evaluated, characterized, and registered” [7]. CDROMs of hash codes
from a wide variety of commercially distributed software packages are now available
typically for use by law enforcement agencies in computer forensic investigations.
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3.2 Properties, Goals and Classifications of Hash Functions
“At the highest level, hash functions may be split into two classes: unkeyed hash
functions whose specification dictates a single input parameter (a message); and keyed
hash functions, whose specification dictates two distinct inputs, a message and a secret
key” [23]. A more functional classification includes two sub-classifications:
Modification Detection Codes (MDCs), which are unkeyed, and Message Authentication
Codes (MACs), which are keyed. The algorithmic specifications of cryptographic hash
functions are generally said to be public knowledge or unkeyed. Therefore, only MDCs
will be elaborated here.

A hash function (in the unrestricted sense) is a function h which has, as a
minimum, the following two properties [23]:
1. Compression – h maps an input x of arbitrary finite bitlength, to an output
h(x) of fixed bitlength n.
2. Ease of computation – given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute.

When employed in cryptography, the hash functions are usually chosen to have
some additional properties. These requirements for a cryptographic hash function h
include [25]:
1. h(x) is one-way.
2. h(x) is collision-free.
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MDCs are mathematical values, created by a cryptographic hashing algorithm that
is used to test a given file to verify that the data contained in the file has not been
inadvertently or maliciously altered. MDCs may be further classified, to include one-way
hash functions (OWHFs) and collision resistant hash functions (CRHFs).

Hash functions are used to condense a string of characters into a shorter fixedlength value that represents the original string. Hashing is a one-way operation if it is
hard to invert; the ideal hash function or output can not feasibly be determined by
analyzing the hashed values or inputs (preimage resistance), and it is computationally
infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input (2ndpreimage resistance).

“A hash function h maps bit-strings of arbitrary finite length to strings of fixed
length, say n bits. For a domain D and range R with h: DÆR and |D| > |R|, the function
is many-to-one, implying that the existence of collisions (pairs of inputs with identical
output) is unavoidable. Indeed, restricting h to a domain of t-bit inputs (t > n), if h were
“random” in the sense that all outputs were essentially equiprobable, then about 2(t-n)
inputs would map to each output, and two randomly chosen inputs would yield the same
output with probability 2(-n) (independent of t)” [23].

Therefore, a good hash function should not produce the same has value from two
different inputs; it should be collision-free or at least collision resistant. Since the
existence of collisions is guaranteed in many-to-one mappings, the unique hash value
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should be uniquely identifiable with a single input in practice, and collisions should be
computationally difficult to find (essentially never occurring in practice). “The term
collision-resistant hash function is sometimes used to describe a hash function that
possesses all three of the properties described here and it is what most people have in
mind when talking about hash functions in general” [26].

“A cryptographic hash function or checksum should, in practice, guarantee that
any tampering with a file will result in a different checksum, and that in practice no on
will be able to come up with any different file which also produces the same original
checksum. They simply prevent anyone from changing a file in any way without leaving
evidence that they have done so (in the form of a changed checksum)” [27].

3.3 Hash Function Structure
Ralph Merkle and Ivan Damgard made a significant contribution to cryptographic
hash function design by proving that a collision resistant hash function can be constructed
using a collision resistant compression function. A compression function takes a fixedlength input and returns a shorter, fixed length output. Given a compression function, a
hash function can be defined by an iterative application of the compression function until
the entire message has been processed. The computation of the hash value for some
message depends on what is called a chaining variable.

“At the start of hashing, this chaining variable has a fixed initial value which is
specified as part of the algorithm. In the process, a message of arbitrary length is broken
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into blocks whose length depends on the compression function, and “padded” (for
security reasons) so the size of the message is a multiple of the block size. The blocks
are then processed sequentially by the compression function, taking as input the result of
the chaining variable so far and the current message block. This compression function
continues recursively until the entire message (and any additional padding specified by
the algorithm) has been used. The chaining variable is updated in a suitably complex
way under the action and influence of the current message block being hashed. The final
output value of the chaining variable is the hash value corresponding to the entire
message” [26].

The Merkle-Damgard construction is used by many of the popular hash functions,
including MD5 and SHA-1, which will be discussed later in this paper. However, a
concern with this construction is that finding a collision resistant function can be difficult.
A schematic model of the Merkle-Damgard iterative structure for hash functions is shown
below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Damgard/Merkle Iterative Structure for Hash Functions
(Source: RSA Laboratories)

- 38 -

3.4 Overview of Popular Hash Functions
Well known hash functions include CRC-32, MD4, MD5, and SHA-1. These
widely used hash functions will be briefly overviewed in this section.

The cyclic redundancy check has been an integral part of the computer industry
for quite some time. The CRC-32 algorithm, described in ISO 3309, calculates a
resulting checksum based that is four octets, or 32 bits, in length [28]. CRC-32 is neither
keyed nor collision-proof. Thus, the use of this checksum for message integrity and
validation is not recommended.

MD stands for message digest. MD4 and MD5 are algorithms used to verify data
integrity through the creation of a 128-bit message digest or fingerprint from data input of
any length that is claimed to be unique to that specific data. Both were developed by
Professor Ronald L. Rivest of MIT and are optimized for 32-bit machines.

MD4 was developed in 1990. MD5 is an improved version of MD4; it was
developed in 1992 in conjunction with RSA Data Security, Inc. after a successful attack
was made on MD4. It uses four, more complex, rounds of 16 steps compared to three
rounds in MD4. MD5 is slower, but offers more assurance of data security than MD4.
MD5 will be discussed in greater detail within the next section. The widespread
popularity of the MD family of hash functions is a testament to their innovative and
successful design.
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SHA stands for secure hash algorithm. SHA-1 was designed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and National Security Agency (NSA). It
produces 160-bit hash values and is generally considered to be the preferred hash
algorithm. It is more resistant to cryptanalysis than MD5 and uses 20 steps in each of the
four rounds. However, it is somewhat slower in execution than MD5.

3.5 The MD5 Hash Function
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm was developed in April 1992 by Professor
Ronald L. Rivest at the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science in conjunction with RSA
Data Security, Inc. This algorithm has become widely adopted by computer security
investigators and law enforcement and remains one of the most used hash functions in the
world today. In fact, MD5 has enjoyed widespread use within peer-to-peer file-sharing
networks, where the ability to download a single file from several sources at once is
essentially dependent upon hashing to identify that the files on different machines are
identical, regardless of what they have been named. Furthermore, MD5 hash values for
downloadable files on many public websites are often posted so that the integrity of a file
can be verified once it has been downloaded.

As previously stated, MD5 is basically a way to verify data integrity. The
algorithm computes a digest of the entire data of the message, which is used for
authentication [29]:
“MD5 takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output
a 128-bit message digest, or fingerprint, of the input represented by a 16-digit
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hexadecimal number. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to
produce two messages having the same message digest [on the order of 2^64
operations], or to produce any message having a given pre-specified target
message digest [on the order of 2^128 operations].”

“MD5 is a block-chained digest algorithm, computed over data in phases of 512byte blocks organized as little-endian 32-bit words. Each 512-byte block is digested in 4
phases. Each phase consists of 16 basic steps based on each of 4 logical functions, for a
total of 64 basic steps. The first block is processed with an initial seed, resulting in a
digest that becomes the seed for the next block. In general, each basic step depends on
the output of the prior step. When the last block is computed, its digest is the digest for
the entire stream. This chained seeding prohibits parallel processing of the blocks” [30].
This is shown below in Figure 3:

Data Block
(512 bytes)

Seed
(4 32-bit words)

Data Block
(512 bytes)

Digest
(4 32-bit words)
Block
Digest
Algorithm

Digest
(4 32-bit words)
Block
Digest
Algorithm

Figure 3: MD5 as a Block-chained Digest Algorithm
(Source: Joseph D. Touch / USC Information Sciences Institute)
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The definitive paper on the MD5 hashing algorithm is RFC-1321, written by
Rivest. The contents of that request for comments paper relating to the technical
workings of the MD5 hashing algorithm have been reproduced within the next two
subsections to provide the reader with an understanding of the algorithm. RFC-1321
includes a reference implementation in the C programming language, which can be found
in Appendix A of this text.

3.5.1 Terminology and Notation
In this document a ‘word’ is a 32-bit quantity and a ‘byte’ is an eight-bit quantity.
A sequence of bits can be interpreted in a natural manner as a sequence of bytes, where
each consecutive group of eight bits is interpreted as a byte with the high-order (most
significant) bit of each byte listed first. Similarly, a sequence of bytes can be interpreted
as a sequence of 32-bit words, where each consecutive group of four bytes is interpreted
as a word with the low-order (least significant) byte given first.

Let the symbol "+" denote addition of words (i.e., modulo-2^32 addition). Let X
<<< s denote the 32-bit value obtained by circularly shifting (rotating) X left by s bit
positions. Let not(X) denote the bit-wise complement of X, and let X | Y denote the bitwise OR of X and Y. Let X xor Y denote the bit-wise XOR of X and Y, and let XY
denote the bit-wise AND of X and Y.
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3.5.2 MD5 Algorithm Description
We begin by supposing that we have a b-bit message as input, and that we wish
to find its message digest. Here b is an arbitrary nonnegative integer; b may be zero, it
need not be a multiple of eight, and it may be arbitrarily large. We imagine the bits of the
message written down as follows:
m0 m1 ... mb-1

The following five steps are performed to compute the message digest of the
message.
Step 1. Append Padding Bits
The message is "padded" (extended) so that its length (in bits) is congruent
to 448, modulo 512. That is, the message is extended so that it is just 64 bits shy
of being a multiple of 512 bits long. Padding is always performed, even if the
length of the message is already congruent to 448, modulo 512. Padding is
performed as follows: a single "1" bit is appended to the message, and then "0"
bits are appended so that the length in bits of the padded message becomes
congruent to 448, modulo 512. In all, at least one bit and at most 512 bits are
appended.

Step 2. Append Length
A 64-bit representation of b (the length of the message before the padding
bits were added) is appended to the result of the previous step. In the unlikely
event that b is greater than 264, then only the low-order 64 bits of b are used.
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(These bits are appended as two 32-bit words and appended low-order word first
in accordance with the previous conventions.) At this point the resulting message
(after padding with bits and with b) has a length that is an exact multiple of 512
bits. Equivalently, this message has a length that is an exact multiple of 16 (32bit) words. Let M[0 ... N-1] denote the words of the resulting message, where N
is a multiple of 16.

Step 3. Initialize MD Buffer
A four-word buffer (A,B,C,D) is used to compute the message digest.
Here each of A, B, C, D is a 32-bit register. These registers are initialized to the
following values in hexadecimal, low-order bytes first):
word A: 01 23 45 67
word B: 89 ab cd ef
word C: fe dc ba 98
word D: 76 54 32 10

Step 4. Process Message in 16-Word Blocks
We first define four auxiliary functions that each take as input three 32-bit
words and produce as output one 32-bit word.
F(X,Y,Z) = XY | not(X) Z
G(X,Y,Z) = XZ | Y not(Z)
H(X,Y,Z) = X xor Y xor Z
I(X,Y,Z) = Y xor (X v not(Z))
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In each bit position F acts as a conditional: if X then Y else Z. The
function F could have been defined using + instead of v since XY and not (X)Z
will never have 1's in the same bit position.) It is interesting to note that if the bits
of X, Y, and Z are independent and unbiased, the each bit of F(X,Y,Z) will be
independent and unbiased.

The functions G, H, and I are similar to the function F, in that they act in
"bitwise parallel" to produce their output from the bits of X, Y, and Z, in such a
manner that if the corresponding bits of X, Y, and Z are independent and
unbiased, then each bit of G(X,Y,Z), H(X,Y,Z), and I(X,Y,Z) will be independent
and unbiased. Note that the function H is the bit-wise "xor" or "parity" function
of its inputs.

This step uses a 64-element table T[1 ... 64] constructed from the sine
function. Let T[i] denote the i-th element of the table, which is equal to the
integer part of 4294967296 times abs(sin(i)), where I is in radians. The elements
of the table are given in the appendix.

Do the following:
/* Process each 16-word block. */
For i = 0 to N/16-1 do

/* Copy block i into X. */
For j = 0 to 15 do
Set X[j] to M[i*16+j].
end /* of loop on j */
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/*
AA
BB
CC
DD

Save A as AA, B as BB, C as CC, and D as DD. */
= A
= B
= C
= D

/* Round 1. */
/* Let [abcd k s i] denote the operation
a = b + ((a + F(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
/* Do the following 16 operations. */
[ABCD 0
[ABCD 4
[ABCD 8
[ABCD 12

7 1]
7 5]
7 9]
7 13]

[DABC 1
[DABC 5
[DABC 9
[DABC 13

12 2] [CDAB 2 17 3] [BCDA 3 22 4]
12 6] [CDAB 6 17 7] [BCDA 7 22 8]
12 10] [CDAB 10 17 11] [BCDA 11 22 12]
12 14] [CDAB 14 17 15] [BCDA 15 22 16]

/* Round 2. */
/* Let [abcd k s i] denote the operation
a = b + ((a + G(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
/* Do the following 16 operations. */
[ABCD 1
[ABCD 5
[ABCD 9
[ABCD 13

5
5
5
5

17]
21]
25]
29]

[DABC 6
[DABC 10
[DABC 14
[DABC 2

9
9
9
9

18]
22]
26]
30]

[CDAB 11 14 19] [BCDA 0
[CDAB 15 14 23] [BCDA 4
[CDAB 3 14 27] [BCDA 8
[CDAB 7 14 31] [BCDA 12

20
20
20
20

20]
24]
28]
32]

/* Round 3. */
/* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation
a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
/* Do the following 16 operations. */
[ABCD 5
[ABCD 1
[ABCD 13
[ABCD 9

4
4
4
4

33]
37]
41]
45]

[DABC 8
[DABC 4
[DABC 0
[DABC 12

11
11
11
11

34]
38]
42]
46]

[CDAB 11 16 35] [BCDA 14 23 36]
[CDAB 7 16 39] [BCDA 10 23 40]
[CDAB 3 16 43] [BCDA 6 23 44]
[CDAB 15 16 47] [BCDA 2 23 48]

/* Round 4. */
/* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation
a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
/* Do the following 16 operations. */
[ABCD 0
[ABCD 12
[ABCD 8
[ABCD 4

6
6
6
6

49]
53]
57]
61]

[DABC 7 10
[DABC 3 10
[DABC 15 10
[DABC 11 10

50]
54]
58]
62]

[CDAB 14 15 51] [BCDA 5 21
[CDAB 10 15 55] [BCDA 1 21
[CDAB 6 15 59] [BCDA 13 21
[CDAB 2 15 63] [BCDA 9 21

52]
56]
60]
64]
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/* Then perform the following additions. (That is increment each
of the four registers by the value it had before this block
was started.) */
A
B
C
D

=
=
=
=

A
B
C
D

+
+
+
+

AA
BB
CC
DD

end /* of loop on i */

Step 5. Output
The message digest produced as output is A, B, C, D. That is, we begin
with the low-order byte of A, and end with the high-order byte of D.”

3.5.3 How Secure is the MD5 Algorithm?
The MD5 hashing algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and
produces as output a 128-bit “fingerprint” or “message digest” of the input. In RFC
1321, Rivest stated, “it is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce two
messages having the same message digest [on the order of 264 operations], or to produce
any message having a given pre-specified target message digest [on the order of 2128
operations” [29]. A 128-bit hash value is so unique that there are 2128 or 3.4028e+38
different possible MD5 hash values, a value so vast when compared to the total number
of electronic files that have been created during the course of human history. Thus, hash
representations can be treated as “fingerprints” or “signatures” for files: so far no two
files have ever been found that have the same MD5 code.
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According to Simson Garfinkel’s writings on the MD5 hashing algorithm [27]:
“Mathematically, its easy to see that billions and billions of messages have
the same MD5 result, because the MD5 function produces only 128 bits of
output—just sixteen 8-bit digits. So theoretically, if a message is only 17
characters in length, there would probably be 256 different messages that have the
same MD5 code [checksum] (because there would be 256 more possible
messages than possible MD5 codes, which means that some codes would have to
be reused).

So why does MD5 seem so secure? Because 128-bits allows you to have
2128 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 different possible
MD5 codes. That is a number that is billions and billions of times larger than the
total number of documents that will ever be created by the human race for the
next thousand years. So even though many different documents have the same
MD5 code, human beings aren’t likely to find many of them in their lifetimes.”

Den Boer and Bosselaers have made the first important advance in the
cryptanalysis of the MD5 hashing algorithm by discovering what are termed as pseudocollisions for the compression function of MD5 [25] [26]:
“A pseudo-collision for the compression function is exemplified by fixing
the value of some message block and finding two distinct values for the chaining
variable that provide the same output. While the existence of pseudo-collisions is
significant on an analytical level, it is of less practical importance. Recall that
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only a single chaining variable is used during hashing and so the behavior of two
related chaining variables is not directly relevant. Instead, it would be more
significant if we could identify the value of a single chaining variable for which
two different message blocks produce the same output from the compression
function. Such an occurrence would have obvious implications for the collisionresistant property we often desire of a hash function. If the value of the chining
variable involved were not the same as the initial value (as provided in the
algorithm specifications) then such an occurrence would be termed a collision for
the compression function. If, however, we could identify two message blocks
which provide a collision when the pre-specified initial value is used, then we
would have full collisions for the hash function.”

In 1996 it was announced that Hans Dobbertin’s research showed MD5 to be
vulnerable to collision search attacks. “While no collisions for MD5 have yet been
found, Dobbertin demonstrated collisions for the MD5 compression function in around
10 hours on a PC” [23]. Since the MD5 hash algorithm was specified in 1992,
computational power has increased exponentially, and some would argue it is no longer
computationally infeasible to intentionally duplicate an MD5 hash. “Van Oorschot and
Wiener have considered a brute-force search for collisions in hash functions, and they
estimate a collision search machine designed specifically for MD5 (costing $10 million in
1994) could find a collision for MD5 in 24 days on average. The general techniques can
be applied to other hash functions” [25].
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“Existing signatures that were generated using MD5 are likely to remain safe
from compromise since it seems that current techniques used to cryptanalyze MD5 do not
offer any advantage in finding a second preimage. Existing signatures should not be
considered as being at risk of compromise at this point. Likewise the random-looking
appearance of the output from MD5 and the property of being one-way are not
considered to be seriously in question” [26].

So, how safe is MD5? No one knows for certain. However, there are sound
reasons to think that MD5 is still quite safe for most purposes, and currently impossible
to defeat in practice. While we do not know that some mathematician will come up with
a systematic method of modifying files without changing their MD5 hash values, we do
know that so far no one has published such a technique. MD5 has resisted a considerable
amount of professional analysis by cryptographers attempting to see if it can be defeated.

3.5.4 Why Choose MD5 Over Other Standard Hashing Algorithms?
Rivest states that “although MD5 is slightly slower than MD4, it is a strengthened
algorithm and more conservative in design. MD5 was designed because it was felt that
MD4 was ‘“at the edge’” in terms of risking successful cryptanalytic attack. MD5 backs
off a bit, giving up a little in speed for a much greater likelihood of ultimate security”
[29].

While MD4 is considered obsolete due to its ease of cryptanalytic attack, MD5 is
still considered to be safe. SHA-1 is a revision of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA),
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which was revised due to an unreported fault in the original implementation. Even
though SHA-1 now appears to be stronger cryptographically, MD5 can still be considered
for use in hashed Modification Detection Codes (MDCs) for applications where the
superior performance of MD5 is critical. Again, users must remain aware of possible
cryptanalytic developments regarding any particular cryptographic hash function, as new
discoveries regarding existing algorithms are made and as new algorithms are developed.
The MD5 hashing algorithm is designed to be simple to implement and very efficient on
32-bit computer systems. It does not require any large substitution tables and can be
coded very compactly. Table 3 below depicts a summary of popular hash functions and
their relative speeds and upper bounds on strength. The number of cipher or compression
function operations currently believed necessary to find preimages and collisions are also
specified.

Name
MD4
MD5
SHA-1

Bitlength Operations to
Operations to
Rounds x Steps
Find Collision
Find Preimage
per round
128
2^20
2^128
3 x 16
128
2^64
2^128
4 x 16
160
2^80
2^160
4 x 20
Table 3: Summary of selected hash functions based on MD4

Relative
Speed
1.00
0.68
0.28
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Chapter 4
4.1 The Need for a National Software Reference Library
A typical desktop computer contains gigabytes of information—perhaps as many
as 100,000 individual files or even more. In some investigations, multiple computers and
various storage devices such as magnetic tapes, thumb drives, and other types of media
are involved. To manually investigate each and every one of the files stored within a
typical computer system would take a monumental effort and be very expensive. Such an
undertaking could take literally thousands of staff hours and months to complete.
Compounding the problem is the large increase in criminal cases involving electronic
evidence over the past decade. “The FBI alone investigated well over 5,000 cases [in
2002], compared with a few hundred just 10 years ago” [31]. These cases include child
pornography, racketeering, hacking, cyber-attacks, illegal gambling, Internet fraud,
identity theft, and software piracy.

Many of the files residing on a typical computer are executable files, operating
system files, library files, installation files, etc., and many do not produce evidentiary
value toward an investigation. Computer forensics investigators must develop methods
and automated tools to efficiently and effectively identify and filter out these unaltered,
common system files. Law enforcement officials often utilize databases to identify
evidence such as fibers, inks, firearms, and fingerprints in their investigations. With this
in mind, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the
National Software Reference Library (NSRL) as a database of cryptographic hashes of
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files from legitimate software packages. These cryptographic hashes can be compared to
the hashes of files from the body of evidence, and an investigator can dramatically
eliminate as many known files as possible that are not relevant to the investigation.

4.2 Established Criteria by Law Enforcement
The NSRL is designed to meet four criteria established to counter law
enforcement’s objections to other computer forensics tools available in the marketplace.
The objections and criteria for a software library and signature database were [32]:

1) Objection: “There are no unbiased and neutral organizations involved in the
implementation of investigative tools.”

Criteria: NIST is a neutral organization (not law enforcement or a software
vendor) chosen for its international reputation in providing clean, unbiased, and
objective reference data.

2) Objection: “Law enforcement has no control over the quality of data provided by
the available tools since they come from independent market-driven sources.”

Criteria: NIST provides an open rigorous process for assuring the quality of the
data.
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3) Objection: “There are no repositories of original software available from which
data can be reproduced.”

Criteria: The NSRL will become an international resource software repository for
the constituent file information included in the data. NIST data is traceable and
court-admissible.

4) Objection: “Each tool provides only a limited set of capabilities with respect to
the information that can be obtained from file systems under investigation.”

Criteria: The reference data will include full information on each file including
cross-reference of data for use by other tools.

4.3 Construction of the National Software Reference Library
The NSRL project is supported by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National
Institute of Justice, NIST’s Office of Law Enforcement Standards, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, the
Department of Justice’s Technical Support Working Group, the U.S. Customs Service,
and numerous other federal, state and local law enforcement, government, software
vendors, and industry organizations. The NSRL project is designed to provide research,
development, and evaluation of new and existing forensic technologies and methods to
further the effective and efficient use of technology used in the investigation of computer
related crimes.
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The NSRL is a physical repository of nearly 4,000 software titles including
operating systems, utilities and applications, database management systems, graphics
packages, component libraries, games, etc. The library contains a balance of the most
popular (most encountered by investigators) and most desired (most pirated by criminals)
software products. The NSRL currently contains software in 32 languages. Information
about the software such as application name, version, manufacturer, etc. is entered into a
database, and a unique identifier is allocated to the software package, as well as
identifiers for each piece of media in the package. The NSRL also contains file profiles
and file signatures (or “fingerprints”) that can be used to identify known and unknown
files on computer systems that are being analyzed as part of an investigation. Each
software title is catalogued and stored on shelves at NIST for archival and reference
purposes.

The NSRL gathers its software from numerous sources. Original commercial
off-the-shelf software is both purchased by, and donated to, the NSRL. Individual
software manufacturers and other organizations make donations are made either via the
original commercial media or a download from a corporate or other website. This
software is documented as an original source for known files and stored on CD, DVD,
diskette, or magnetic tape as a permanent part of the NSRL. “The concept is to collect as
many different examples, versions, and updates of software as possible in order to
generate file signatures for as many known files as possible” [33].
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“The NSRL is also investigating downloaded files from websites, by burning the
downloads onto CDs that can be stored on [its] shelves. The digital signatures from these
files are not traceable to [NIST’s] level of satisfaction and are not included in the RDS,
but are available as they may be of interest to the community.” [34]

4.4 The NSRL Reference Data Set (RDS)
The NSRL gathers its software from many sources as stated above and then
integrates file profiles computed from this software containing file signatures and other
identifying information into a Reference Data Set (RDS). As of December 2003, the
RDS contains nearly 18 million files (consisting of nearly 8 million hash codes). Law
enforcement, government, and industry can utilize the RDS to review computer files by
matching file profiles with those in the database to make their investigations more
efficient.

This is achieved by calculating a unique identifier or hash code which is a
hexadecimal character string for each file based on its contents. The hash code is
computed in such a way that if one bit in the file is changed, a completely different hash
code is produced. “To minimize the possibility that two different files may generate the
same hash code, a sufficiently large hash value is computed” [3].

- 56 -

Each fingerprint is unique to a specific file and can be used to determine if [35]:


A file has been altered.



A file has been renamed or other means to hide it have been attempted.



A file is what it purports to be.



A file is missing when it should be found.



A file is actually present on a disk.

Four file signatures are created for each file within the RDS. The hash values
used in NSRL’s Reference Data Set are the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), Message
Digest 4 (MD4), Message Digest 5 (MD5), and a 32-bit Cyclical Redundancy Checksum
(CRC32). The use of multiple algorithms allows any one particular hash value to be
cross-referenced. “Additionally, this further ensures that no two files will have the same
set of hash values” [3].

The hash values, directory name, file name, file size, version, and other source
information for each file are stored within the RDS. The computed hash values are
validated by a separate, parallel, and independent process to ensure they can be verified
to identify specific files in the RDS. Upon successful verification and validation, the
RDS is written to a master CD, duplicated, and distributed through NIST’s Standard
Reference Data Office as Special Database #28, available online at
http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistd28.htm [35].
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RDS subscriptions are available from NIST at a current cost of $90 per year,
which entitles the purchaser to receive up to four quarterly releases. Those who
contribute to the NSRL receive one release at no cost. NIST encourages, and does not
charge for, redistribution of the RDS.

Special Database #28 was first released in October 2001. The RDS is distributed
when sufficient changes to the database have been made, which to date has been
quarterly. Each release is a cumulative, full version. The NSRL is used by many law
enforcement and computer forensics organizations by importing data from the RDS into
various computer forensic tools.

A permuted index accessible via the Internet lists software made available with
the latest RDS release. It can be sorted by product name (i.e., “Age of Empires” or
"Nero”), manufacturer name (i.e., “Microsoft” or “Ahead Softwrae”), application type
(i.e., “Game” or “CD Burning”), language, operating system, or product code (not
intuitive but included for cross references).

4.5 Uses of the RDS
Law enforcement and computer forensics investigators are using cryptographic
hash databases like the NSRL more and more frequently. “By computing the hash of a
suspect file and then looking up that hash in the RDS database, for example, it is possible
to determine if that suspect file is a copy of a file that has previously been evaluated,
characterized, and registered” [7]. If a specific file’s profile and cryptographic hash
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value match the database of known files, then the file can be eliminated from close
scrutiny. If they do match, the file is unknown and should be examined in greater detail.

An example of this file-reduction technique would be a forensic investigation
regarding child pornography on a Windows XP machine. The Windows XP operating
system itself contains nearly 6,000 images, which are known gifs, jpegs, icons, etc. By
applying the hash sets within the NSRL, the investigator will not have to look at any of
those files that match the known file signatures right off the bat. Table 4 below
demonstrates three typical graphics files and one rogue graphic file from an investigation.

bliss.bmp
MD5: AE3FAD12977E9950D0D59E9ABB896616
Matches RDS:
FileSize: 51127
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP)
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP)
(© Microsoft Corporation)

The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can
disregard it for evidentiary value.

win2000l.gif
MD5: 0D3B774F122D2CBF22671EA52085D0E6
Matches RDS:
FileSize: 9644
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP)
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP)
(© Microsoft Corporation)

The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can
disregard it for evidentiary value.
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Blue Lace 16.bmp
MD5: 58EB2320D062E6560872ED8B5809F589
Matches RDS:
FileSize: 5868
ProductCode: 1746 (Microsoft Windows XP)
OpSystemCode: WIN (Microsoft Windows XP)
(© Microsoft Corporation)

The file is flagged as known, and the investigator can
disregard it for evidentiary value.

enterxxx.jpg
MD5: F4ACDCA7290E07132FD1AC9E4FD88D2B
Does Not Match RDS
The file is flagged as unknown, and an investigator
can closely examine it for evidentiary value.
Table 4: Use of the RDS in Examining Graphics Files

Investigators can also search for files that are something other than what they
purport to be. “It is not uncommon for a suspect to hide evidence (i.e., a pornographic
.BMP image) by renaming the file to the same name found in standard operating systems
(i.e., a .BAT file) or software applications” [6]. The contents and corresponding hash
value derived from the camouflaged image will not match the file it claims to be, and it
will not match the entry for the system file within the RDS.

Conversely, the suspect could disguise a known malicious executable file as a
harmless .JPG image, hoping it will go unnoticed. Even if the filename and extension are
changed, the contents and corresponding hash values derived from the file will not
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change. If the computed hash value exists as a known malicious file within the RDS, the
suspect’s attempts to thwart detection will fail.

“The NSRL contains both benign and malicious software and is intended to be
used as a filter of ‘known’ file signatures, not ‘known good’" [36]. Investigators can also
search for files that match a certain profile in the RDS, such as pirated software in the
case of a suspected intellectual property case. Another example would be to search for a
malicious hacking tool or cracked software.

Another use of the RDS is to determine if expected files are missing from a
computer system. This would be a red flag to the investigator, causing him or her to
probe further. For example, the investigator may determine that the suspect has
attempted to hide illegal activity by deleting the missing files.

4.6 Specifications and File Formats of the RDS
NIST has produced a detailed report outlining the formats of data included in the
NSRL RDS distribution [37]. The contents of that document relating to individual data
elements and logical and physical record structures have been reproduced within this
section to provide the reader with an understanding of the database.

4.6.1 RDS Data Elements
Table 5 below represents data elements used in the NSRL RDS distribution
package. Char represents data of type character using UTF-8 encoding of 8-bit bytes.
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Integer represents data of type integer including variations of the integer type (short,
long, etc.)

All of the data is stored in the distribution files in human-readable form. No
binary data or nonstandard characters are used. Char fields are represented by alphabetic,
numeric, and punctuation character strings surrounded by double quotes (“). Integers are
represented by unquoted strings of decimal digits.

DATA ELEMENT

TYPE

ApplicationType

Char

MAXIMUM LENGTH
(IN CHARACTERS)
50

CRC32

Char

8

FileName

Char

255

FileSize
Language

Integer
Char

15
150

MD5

Char

32

MfgCode

Char

15

MfgName

Char

150

DESCRIPTION
Character string that
identifies a general use of the
software product
32-bit Cyclic Redundancy
Checksum (file signature) of
a specific file as defined in
CCITT X.25 link-level
protocol and FIPS PUB 71
Name of a specific file within
a software product
Size in bytes of a specific file
Character string that
identifies the language(s)
used in the software product
128-bit Message Digest 5
(file signature) of a specific
file as defined in IETF RFC
1321
Character identifier of a
specific vendor or
manufacturer
Identifying name of the
vendor or manufacturer of
the software product, e.g.,
“Microsoft”
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DATA ELEMENT

TYPE

OpSystemName

Char

MAXIMUM LENGTH
(IN CHARACTERS)
150

DESCRIPTION

Identifying name of the
operating system on which
the software product
executes, e.g., “Windows
NT”
OpSystemCode
Char
15
Code identifier of a specific
operating system version
OpSystemVersion
Char
15
Characters that identify
individual versions of an
operating system on which
the software product
executes, e.g., “4.0”
ProductCode
Integer 15
Identifier of a specific
software product, e.g., “103”;
maps to the NSRL database
Product Name
Char
150
Identifying name of the
software product, e.g.
“Netscape Communicator”
ProductVersion
Char
15
Characters that identify
individual versions of a
software product, e.g., “3.0”
RDSVersion
Char
20
Character string that
identifies the date and
version of the RDS
distribution
SHA-1
Char
40
160-bit Secure Hash
Algorithm message digest
(file signature) of a specific
file as defined in FIPS PUB
180-2
SpecialCode
Char
1
A single character field that
identifies special file
signature entries, such as
malicious code signatures or
other types of special entries
Table 5: Data Elements of the NIST NSRL Reference Data Set
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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4.6.2 Logical Record Structure of the RDS
A logical record forms one item or grouping of information from the data
elements defined in the above table within the NSRL RDS. There are five such logical
record types:
1. File record
2. Manufacturer record
3. Product record
4. Operating system record
5. Version record

Each is described in Tables 6 through 10 below. Examples of each type of record are
also provided. Figure 4, also shown below, illustrates how these files relate to each other.

Figure 4: NSRL RDS Logical Record Relationships
(Source: National Institute for Standards and Technology)
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RECORD
FORMAT
SHA-1

EXAMPLE

CRC32
FileName
FileSize
ProductCode

“AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F1
2DD491CA”
“DC2311FFDC0015FCCC12130FF145DE78
”
“14CCE9061FFDC001”
“WORD.EXE”
1217654
103

OpSystemCode

“NT4WKS”

SpecialCode

“”

MD5

COMMENTS

In bytes
The Product
record will
contain more
information about
this product code.
The Operating
System record
will contain more
information about
this operating
system code.
Blank (no value)
– normal file
“M” – malicious
file
“S” – special file

Table 6: File Record
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

RECORD
FORMAT
MfgCode

MfgName

EXAMPLE

COMMENTS

“Microsoft”

MfgCode is
referenced in the
Operating System
and Product
records. MfgCode
is unique within
this record set.

“Microsoft Corporation”
Table 7: Manufacturer Record
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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RECORD
FORMAT
OpSystemCode

EXAMPLE

COMMENTS

“NT4WKS”

OpSystemCode is
referenced in the
File record and is
unique within the
Operating System
record set.

OpSystemName
OpSystemVersion
MfgCode

“Windows NT”
“4.0”
“Microsoft”

MfgCode references
an entry in the
Manufacturer
record.

Table 8: Operating System Record
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

RECORD
FORMAT
ProductCode

EXAMPLE

COMMENTS

103

ProductCode is
referenced in the
File record and is
unique within the
Product record set.

ProductName
ProductVersion
OpSystemCode

“Microsoft Word”
“2000”
“Win98”

MfgCode

“Microsoft”

Language

“English”

OpSystemCode is
referenced in the
Operating System
record.
MfgCode references
an entry in the
Manufacturer
record.
If multiple
languages are
present, they will be
comma separated
within this field.

ApplicationType

“Operating System”
Table 9: Product Record
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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RECORD
FORMAT
SHA-1

EXAMPLE

COMMENTS

“AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F1
2DD491CA”

RDSVersion

“2001/03/08 0.2”

This value of SHA1 is computed from
the SHA-1 values of
the four other files.
Assigned to each
quarterly release of
the RDS.

Table 10: RDS Version Record
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

4.6.3 Physical Record Structure of the RDS
The RDS consists of five physical data files that correspond to the five logical
record types, one file per logical record type. The character format is UTF-8 (8-bit
ASCII), one logical record per physical line terminated with ASCII characters 13 and 10
(hexadecimal 0D0A). Individual fields are separated by comma (,) within each line.
Character field values are surrounded by double quotation marks (“”). The first record of
each file contains the field names instead of data values. Examples of the contents of
each file are presented in Tables 1 through 15 below. The first record in each figure
represents the first or header record found in each file. The second record in each figure
represents all subsequent or detail records in each file.

”SHA-1”,”MD5”,”CRC32”,“FileName”,”FileSize”,”ProductCode”,”OpSystemCode”,
”SpecialCode” <13><10>
“AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F12DD491CA”,“DC2311FFDC0015FCCC1
2130FF145DE78”,“14CCE9061FFDC001”, “WORD.EXE”,1217654,103, ”T4WKS”,””
<13><10>
Table 11: Example FILE Data
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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“MfgCode”,”MfgName” <13><10>
“Microsoft”,“Microsoft Corporation” <13><10>
Table 12: Example MANUFACTURER Data
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

“OpSystemCode”,“OpSystemName”,“OpSystemVersion”,“MfgCode” <13><10>
“NT4WKS”,“Windows NT”,“4.0”,“Microsoft” <13><10>
Table 13: Example OPERATING SYSTEM Data
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

“ProductCode”,“ProductName”,“ProductVersion”,“MfgCode”,”OpSystemCode”
<13><10>
“103”,“Microsoft Office”,“2000”,“Microsoft”,”Win98”,”English”,”Word Processor”
<13><10>
Table 14: Example PRODUCT Data
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

“SHA-1”,”RDSVersion” <13><10>
“DD161AEFCC271124533FFFA1445764BDE12515AE”,“2001/03/08 0.2” <13><10>
Table 15: Example RDS VERSION Data
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)

4.7 Current Version of the RDS
The latest version of RDS is Version 2.3, which was released in December 2003
on four CDs. Each CD can be used separately as a targeted hash set for any of four
categories: non-English files, operating systems, applications, and images. Each hash set
is variable in size with a full complement of files from one or more packages. “The files
contained within the RDS are named NSRLFILE.TXT, NSRLOS.TXT,
NSRLMFG.TXT, NSRLPROD.TXT, and VERSION.TXT” [38]. The investigator can
determine whether to use these files separately, or to concatenate and arrange them into a
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combined database of information, as needed. The contents of the latest RDS version are
shown below in Table 16.

CD #
CD "A"
CD "B"
CD "C"
CD "D"

Contents
Non-English Files
Operating Systems
Applications
Images
TOTAL

Files
4,644,674
2,513,772
7,545,675
3,205,843
17,909,964

Unique SHA-1 Values
1,465,141
1,078,149
3,209,385
2,568,575
7,198,856

Filename
NSRLMfg.txt

Corresponding MD5 and SHA-1 Values
MD5:
0AD310394129BB2F031ECE85DA019CD5
SHA-1:
A7F79564A95CC4AC023012191539BA536AE4C606
NSRLOS.txt
MD5:
0E36C2617221AB6962CCB3D70F835D9A
SHA-1:
E316A8F86CCE25AAC996BC4FBF217DD5393DA040
NSRLProd.txt
MD5:
4CEB71FFBFF905EDE38F3D6A6317F514
SHA-1:
E5B3C6815C4AA0966F86D524DB356414063F93E4
NSRLFile.txt (CD “A”) MD5:
C0214C9E873742175F37728277C1081E
SHA-1:
B7DAFF4A43D39AF918947254E2634559829E754A
NSRLFile.txt (CD “B”) MD5:
EC72F9E0509E9B6FF1F7B0E938E2EB3C
SHA-1:
7FE9F1986A6DD7589ED9DAD7E9CD3C9FACF8D954
NSRLFile.txt (CD “C”) MD5:
DC48A4A42BE49D86563C104DF534E289
SHA-1:
C684A18C2A6297F6ACFC875766A767C28FE73CD6
NSRLFile.txt (CD “D”) MD5:
B15B2DAFEA1A0C821CC3117251B43B1D
SHA-1:
211CA86816C235BE02A9D89C3E3801D22298AB91
Table 16: Current Version of the NSRL RDS
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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4.8 Effectiveness of the RDS Hash Sets
The NSRL allows the investigator to focus on unknown files which do not have
profiles and fingerprints in the NSRL database. “The reference library is a tool that can
cut an investigator’s time by 25 to 95 percent, depending on the number of files on the
hard drive,” according to Gary Fisher of the NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory
and project manager for NSRL [31]. Table 17, a reprint of Table 1 from Chapter 1, is
shown below with the number and percentages of files successfully identified by the
NSRL RDS.

OS/APPS

FILES
INSTALLED

PERCENT
IDENTIFIED

FILES
UNKNOWN

Virgin Win98
Virgin NT4 WS
Virgin Win2K
Pro
Virgin Win ME
Win98+Office
2K
Win ME+Office
2K

4,266
1,659
5,963

93%
86%
86%

297
239
839

FILES ON
DISTRIBUTION
CD(S)
18,662
17,904
16,539

5,169
23,464

93%
98%

383
596

11,512
43,327

24,112

98%

526

32,758

Table 17: Effectiveness of the NSRL RDS
(Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology)
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Chapter 5
5.1 Software Design Methodology
In the analysis stage of a computer forensics investigation, it is not typically
possible or practical to examine all suspect files. Therefore, investigators rely upon
effective yet efficient methods that can quickly reduce the number of files requiring close
examination. One such method, to group files into two general categories: known and
unknown, is implemented by this research. The resulting software application is detailed
within this chapter. The underlying design methodology is to calculate the hash values
for suspect files and compare them with a database of known file hash values and file
profiles, i.e., the NSRL RDS database. An overview of this process is given below in
Figure 5.

Unknown Files

Image of Seized Disk

Forensic Investigation
Analysis Application

Known Files

NSRL Hash Values
Figure 5: Software Design Methodology
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This software application assumes that the drive being analyzed is a forensic bit
stream backup of the original storage media. This ensures that none of the original
evidence can possibly be damaged or corrupted during the analysis process. The
application also assumes that any and all previously deleted files have been restored
using a separate forensic file recovery application.

This software application was created using Visual Basic 6.0, Service Pack 5.
This programming environment allows for rapid application development and the
creation of a graphical user interface, which is quickly becoming the preferred operating
environment by forensics analysts. The full source code listings for this software
application can be found in Appendix B of this text. Figure 6, shown below, shows a
sample execution of the software application.

Figure 6: Sample Execution of the Software Application
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5.2 Preparing Data from the RDS
As stated in Chapter 4, the RDS contains signatures and file profiles within a
four-CD distribution, each of which targets one of the following areas: non-English files,
operating systems, applications, and images. Information defining each file’s profile is
contained in a relational format between several comma separated text files on the RDS
distribution:


NSRLMfg.txt contains information relating individual files to any of 514
software manufacturers.



NSRLOS.txt relates individual files to any of 28 operating system
configurations. These entries include details of the operating system such as
name, version, and manufacturer.



NSRLProd.txt contains information relating individual files to any of 4,726
specific software products. These entries include details of the software
product, including name, version, operating system, manufacturer, language,
and application type.



NSRLFile.txt contains the central file profile information. This file contains
the SHA-1, MD5, and CRC32 hash values for each file within the RDS, file
name, file size, product information, operating system, and a special code.
This special code serves as a red flag for the investigator, denoting whether
the file is “known good” or “known bad.” The entire RDS contains
17,909,964 unique file profiles and 7,198,856 unique hash values.
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This data must be organized in such a format that the software program will
efficiently access it. A simple lookup from a sequential file will not serve this purpose,
and typical spreadsheet applications cannot handle nearly eighteen million unique
records. Therefore, a database application such as Microsoft Access is required to
facilitate the RDS database and its interaction with the software application.

Each of the files contained within the RDS is imported as tables into Microsoft
Access databases. Although this research is only relevant to the NSRLFile file, all other
files are imported so that they may be implemented for cross-referencing purposes in the
future. To ensure manageability of data, four databases were created (one for each of the
four CDs within the RDS). This is done using the Import Wizard to import the files as a
comma delimited format. The first row contains field names and text is qualified within
quotation marks. Each of the four files on the CD are imported into four tables, each
with its respective name. Data types (i.e., text, long integer, etc.) are assigned for each of
the fields. The NSRLFile table is then sorted and indexed by the MD5 hash code. This is
essential for comparing the calculated hash values from the seized hard drive with the
database in an expedient manner. No primary key is needed, since each table has
uniquely identifiable codes.

Figures 7 – 10, shown below, show each of the four database tables created from
the comma delimited information contained within the RDS database: NSRLMfg,
NSRLOS, NSRLProd, and NSRLFile. Each of these particular tables is derived from
CD_A, the database containing non-English software.
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Figure 7: Sample NSRLFile Table

Figure 8: Sample NSRLMfg Table
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Figure 9: Sample NSRLOS Table

Figure 10: Sample NSRLProd Table
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In order to facilitate data between the four database tables, relationships are
required between common fields (i.e., ProductCode, OpSystemCode, MfgCode). Figure
11, shown below, demonstrates the relationships that are created between data tables.

Figure 11: Relationships Created Between Data Tables

5.3 Logging the Investigation
Two types of logs are kept by the software application. These logs can be used to
further assist the investigator, i.e., he or she may take the information produced in comma
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separated format by these log files and manipulate the data using a spreadsheet
application. The first is a general application log that contains the date and time of every
command performed by the investigator. This log file is created within a directory
named “Logs” at the beginning of the software application’s execution and the filename
corresponds with the current date and time at execution. For example, if an investigation
were performed on February 27, 2004 at 10:40:39 (24-hour clock), the resulting filename
would be 02272004104039.txt. This naming convention ensures that no two log files
will have the same name. An example of the contents of a typical log file is shown
below:

02/27/2004 10:40:39
02/27/2004 10:40:47
02/27/2004 10:42:21
02/27/2004 10:43:02
02/27/2004 11:24:36

Log File Created
Disk Analysis of C:\Inetpub created.
Filename: 02272004104047.txt
File preview of filename: printer.gif
Disk Analysis of C:\Windows created.
Filename: 02272004104302.txt
Log File Closed

The other log file created by the software application maintains information about
each of the files investigated by the analysis process. This log file is created within a
directory named “Diskanalysis” at the beginning of each execution of the “Choose
Folder” command. The filename is created using the same naming convention as the
general application log. This log contains the path of each file investigated by the
software application, its MD5 hash result, and a flag alerting the investigator whether or
not the file matches the RDS database. An example of the contents of a typical log file is
shown below:
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"Path","MD5 Hash",”Match”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\bluebarh.gif","409f500aca53f8102d9a8c2dbd1f1a61",”X”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\bluebarv.gif","f915c1b57047a31fe0e257e8e853e5f9",”X”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\default.htm","06c36aa1b2c265accc7d4b49745eda57",”X”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\msrdp.cab","7da462cd62642f2a61e8fec78cdf52a1",”X”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\Thumbs.db","718f03a2785433c26c8d960f64879b25",””
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\win2000l.gif","0d3b774f122d2cbf22671ea52085d0e6",”X”
"C:\WINDOWS\Web\TSWeb\win2000r.gif","3540a7d2df234eafcbb475d795284f29",”X”

5.4 Searching for Files
The first step in analyzing files contained on the forensic backup of the original
media begins with the computer forensics investigator pressing the “Choose Folder”
command from the toolbar. The software application utilizes the BrowseForFolder
functionality of Visual Basic as shown below:
getdir = BrowseForFolder(Me, "Select A Directory", "c:\")

A function then executes to recursively list each of the files within the specified
folder, including all of the folder’s subdirectories. Using the FileSystemObject Object
Model, the software application can easily access folders and files. The function, shown
below, extracts information from each file, including name, size, type, creation date and
time, accessed date and time, modification date and time, path, and attributes. During
this process, the status bar at the bottom of the application window informs the
investigator which file is currently being processed. The information gathered by this
function is then stored in hidden fields of a ListView control corresponding to the file
under investigation for future use.
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Set fol = fso.GetFolder(sPath)
For Each fil In fol.Files
Set listobj = ListView1.ListItems.add(, , fil.Name)
listobj.SubItems(1) = fil.Size
listobj.SubItems(2) = fil.Type
listobj.SubItems(3) = fil.DateCreated
listobj.SubItems(4) = fil.DateLastAccessed
listobj.SubItems(5) = fil.DateLastModified
listobj.SubItems(6) = fil.Path
listobj.SubItems(7) = fil.Attributes
For Each sub1 In fol.SubFolders
ShowAllFiles sub1.Path
Next

5.5 Hashing Files
Visual Basic does not natively contain any file hashing functionality. The MD5
reference implementation is written in the C programming language, so a dynamic linked
library (DLL) is programmed using the source code from the MD5 reference
implementation. This DLL, also written in C, allows the software application to compute
MD5 digest strings for files. To do so, a Visual Basic module is implemented to contain
a wrapper function that takes a filename as input, calls the DLL which generates the MD5
digest of the file’s content, and passes the resulting hash value back to the software
application. These hash results are stored within hidden fields for each file under
examination in the ListView control for later use in comparing hash values with the RDS
database.

5.5.1 A Note Regarding Zero-Byte Files
As previously stated, the MD5 file hashing algorithm is performed over an entire
message and the resulting hash value depends upon each and every bit of the input. Zero-
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byte files contain zero bits; therefore they will always result in the exact hash value. The
message digest for zero-byte files is D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E. The
NSRL RSD contains numerous zero-byte hash values and file profiles, so an alternative
method of filtering these files is required. If a particular file under investigation results in
a match with the RDS database, and the resulting hash value is equal to that of a zerobyte file, then other characteristics of that file must be compared to the file profile within
the RDS. If the file name matches the one found in the profile, then the file is classified
as known. Otherwise, it is classified as unknown, and the investigator can conduct
further analysis on the file.

It is also worth noting that zero byte files, if contained on a Windows NT, 2000,
or XP NTFS partition, may contain data streams. These data streams are cleverly
concealed from the investigator, and do not show as data within the zero-byte file. Thus,
each and every zero-byte file on the suspect hard drive should be analyzed for data
streams.

5.6 Comparing File Hashes with the RDS
Once a directory and its corresponding subdirectory tree is successfully hashed by
the software application, the hash values must be compared with the RDS database and
classified as either known or unknown. This procedure is conducted using ADODB
connections to each of the four RDS database files created in the file importation process.
The software application takes the hash value of the file currently being examined from
the ListView control and queries the four databases, in sequential order, using a function
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provided by the Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0 provider named Seek. This function is very
efficient in finding the hash values from the millions of records inside the indexed table
of files and their corresponding hash values and profiles within the database. If a match
is determined, the matching hash value and file name are sent back to the software
application where they are stored in hidden fields inside the ListView corresponding to
the file currently under examination. Additionally, the file is red-flagged with an “X” in
a visible field labeled as “Match” to alert the investigator whether or not the file matches
the RDS database. An example of a query performed by the software application on the
first database file is shown below:
Rset1.Seek hashval
If Not Rset1.EOF Then
fname = Rset!FileName
outhash = Rset1!MD5
matcha = outhash & " " & fname
matchfound = "X"
Else
matcha = ""
End If

5.7 Investigative Analysis Views
Computer forensics analysis requires investigators to work in a hands-on
environment and utilize adept visual sensory skills. To aid the investigator in his or her
examination of those files that are unknown (i.e., those files not matching the RDS
database of known hash values and file profiles), the software application developed in
association with this research features a wealth of visual information. This visual
information includes a hex editor view, file information view, and file preview view.
These features are explained in detail within the following three subsections.
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5.7.1 Hex Editor View
The Hex Editor view allows a computer forensics investigator to determine the
hexadecimal and ASCII contents of a file under analysis. By viewing a file’s header
information, an investigator can quickly determine if a file is camouflaged (e.g., a
renamed image, sound, or video file) or if other metadata contained within a file is of
evidentiary value.

This procedure loads the file selected from the ListView control and opens it for
binary access read access. The contents of the file are read into a string variable named
HexText. The file is then closed, and the HexText string is translated by a function
named FileToHex which translates the data into its corresponding hexadecimal and
ASCII format. The results are displayed in a specially formatted ListView, as shown in
the example in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Hex Editor View
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5.7.2 File Information View
A file information view is also provided to the computer forensics investigator.
The information provided in this window includes the complete path name of the file
being examined, file attributes, file size, file type, file creation date and time, file
accessed date and time, file modified date and time, MD5 hash value, and matching hash
values and file profiles that correspond with each of the four RDS databases (if
applicable).

This feature provides the investigator with a quick and easy to read overview of
the file being examined and its properties. Each of the values listed in the file
information view are extracted from hidden fields in the ListView control for the file
under examination. The values for the file’s attributes are stored as integer values and bit
manipulations must be performed in order to create a readable text output value to the
investigator. Table 18 below shows the values for possible file attributes. Files can have
any of the following values or any logical combination of these values. Descriptions for
each attribute and the source code written to determine a file’s attributes are also shown.
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Constant

Value Description

Source Code

Normal

0

Normal file. No attributes are set.

If attributeval And &H80

ReadOnly

1

Read-only file. Attribute is
read/write.

If attributeval And &H1

Hidden

2

Hidden file. Attribute is read/write.

If attributeval And &H2

System

4

System file. Attribute is read/write.

If attributeval And &H4

Archive

32

File has changed since last backup.
Attribute is read/write.

If attributeval And &H20

Compressed

128

Compressed file. Attribute is readonly.

If attributeval And &H800

Table 18: File Attribute Values, Descriptions, and Associated Source Code
(Source: Microsoft Corporation)

An example of the file information view is given below in Figure 13.

Figure 13: File Information View

5.7.3 File Preview View
A file preview capability is provided to the computer forensics investigator. This
feature allows the investigator to open any file residing on the forensic backup of the
suspect media (e.g., images, sounds, videos, text files, spreadsheets, web pages,
executables, etc.) within the native operating system environment. This can be done only
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if an application exists to handle the particular file format. The file preview function can
be used in conjunction with the hex editor and can be especially useful in investigations
regarding specialized analysis such as pornography, intellectual property, or identity theft
cases.

This capability is made possible by calling the Shell "explorer.exe" function
within Visual Basic:
Shell "explorer.exe" & ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6)

The Windows Explorer kernel executes the file specified by the path name in the
selected item of the ListView control containing the files being examined. An example
of the file preview capability is given below in Figure 14.

Figure 14: File Preview Capability
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Chapter 6
6.1 Success of Research Work
The notion of hash filtering has exploded; however, there are several concerns
with existing software used to compare hash values on a suspect machine with a database
of known hash values. These concerns include that the software is either packaged
within a forensics suite, too expensive, too hard to use, or otherwise unavailable for use
by the general public or most small law enforcement agencies.

The aim of this research is to create a software tool to automate the analysis of a
hard drive under investigation and thus dramatically reduce the number of files that an
investigator must individually examine. This tool utilizes the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL)
database to automatically identify files by comparing hash values of files to “known
good” files (e.g., unaltered application files) and “known bad” files (e.g., exploits). This
tool provides a much smaller list of files to be closely examined.

The goal of creating a simple, streamlined, standalone public tool for automating
the computer forensic investigative process for files on a disk is successfully
implemented in this research.
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6.2 Implications for Computer Forensics Investigators
The scope of this research lies within the analysis phase of a computer forensics
investigation. This presents many implications for the computer forensics investigator.
Computer forensics analysis has been customarily performed within a command-line
operating system like DOS, or a graphical system like Windows, although analysis within
a graphical user interface is being performed more and more frequently. The software
application written as part of this research promotes the trend towards analysis within a
graphical user interface.

Two of the most important goals of the analysis phase are preserving the integrity
of evidence and thorough documentation of the examination. This software application
utilizes a forensic bit stream backup of the original storage medium. The investigator can
analyze all data on the backup copy that might possibly be relevant to the investigation
without modifying or damaging it. This software application also provides the
investigator with complete documentation of what evidence is found during the forensic
analysis. Log files are created and maintained by the software application with all files
discovered and whether or not the files match the RDS database of known hash values
and file profiles.

Hex editors are tools that have been invaluable to investigators since the
beginning of computer forensics analysis. This software application couples the RDS
database with a hex editor. When a particular file is determined to be unknown (by virtue
of not matching any of the hash values and file profiles within the RDS) the investigator
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can easily use the hex editor view to determine the hexadecimal and ASCII contents of
the file. By viewing the file’s header information, an investigator can quickly determine
if a file is camouflaged (e.g., a renamed image, sound, or video file) or if other metadata
contained within a file is of evidentiary value. Furthermore, files can be previewed by
the operating system via a “preview file” command inside the software application.

Forensic utilities must be widely adopted by forensic professionals before they
can become admissible as evidence examination tools in a court of law. Because NIST is
a neutral organization (not law enforcement or a software vendor) with an international
reputation in providing clean, unbiased, and objective reference data that has been
rigorously validated and verified for quality, the NSRL data contained within the RDS is
traceable and court admissible. It has previously been stated that this software
application does not modify or damage the original evidence, a prerequisite for
admissibility in court.

6.3 Software Application Testing
A battery of tests has been created to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of
the software created by this research. These tests were performed on an Intel 2.0 GHz
Pentium 4 system with 1 GB of 800MHz Kingston RDRAM and 100GB 7500 RPM
8MB cache Western Digital hard disk drive running Microsoft Windows XP Professional
Edition.
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6.3.1 Efficiency Tests
The first test is to examine the speed at which the software program can identify
files, calculate their MD5 hash values, and compare those hash values with the
information contained within the RDS.
This was performed on a variety of data:


The first test was performed on 1 GB of random-sized data files. The entire
process executed in approximately 35 seconds.



Another test was performed on 1 GB of data consisting only of 1 MB text files.
The program executed the process in approximately 50 seconds.



The final test was performed on 1 GB of data consisting only of 100 MB video
files. The program executed the process in approximately 30 seconds.

In summary, a computer forensics investigator can expect this program to execute
within roughly 50 – 80 minutes on a 100 GB hard disk drive that is filled to capacity with
data. This expected wait time is comparable to other forensic utilities.

6.3.2 Effectiveness Tests
Using the examples for usage of the RDS presented in Chapter 4, another series of
tests was created to determine the effectiveness of the software created by this research.
The first of these tests examined the scenario in which a suspect may attempt to hide
evidence by renaming files to the same names found in standard operating systems or
software applications. Four image files were disguised as nondescript operating system
files of approximate size. In each case, the files were not recognized by the software
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application and were classified as unknown. An example of this test is shown below in
Figure 15. Note that the file named “netstat.exe” is actually a camouflaged image file.
Examination of the HEX editor view and by executing the “Preview File” feature alerts
the investigator that the file is indeed a JPEG image file disguised as an executable file.

Figure 15: Disguised Image File as an Executable File

A similar test was produced for detecting known files that were renamed to other
filename extensions. The software application successfully recognized the files as
known, and those files were eliminated from close examination. An example of this test
is shown below in Figure 16. Note that the file named “computer.jpg” is actually a
camouflaged executable file, “netstat.exe.” Examination of the HEX editor view and by
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executing the “Preview File” feature alerts the investigator that the file is indeed an
executable file disguised as an image file.

Figure 16: Disguised Executable File as an Image File

A simple test was developed to compare the results of analysis between a
legitimate and cracked version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 utility. The results of
the examination of the legitimate version are shown below in Figure 17, and the
legitimate version in Figure 18. Notice that three of the files have changed hash values,
and no longer match the RDS database of known hash values. The software application
properly identified the legitimate and cracked versions as known and unknown,
respectively.
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Figure 17: Legitimate Version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 Utility

Figure 18: Cracked Version of Symantec’s Norton Ghost 2002 Utility
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A final test was created to determine the software application’s effectiveness at
identifying files containing steganography. The default Windows XP desktop image,
“Bliss.bmp,” was injected with the secret message “Computer Forensics” using the
wbStego steganography utility and named “Bliss Stego.bmp.” The two files were
compared to the RDS using the software application. The program accurately calculated
a changed hash value for the “Bliss Stego.bmp” file, and characterized it as unknown.
This is depicted below in Figure 19. A computer forensics investigator may determine
that steganalysis of the rogue file is appropriate for his or her investigation.

Figure 19: Steganography Within Known Image Files
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6.4 Recommendations for Future Work
While the software implemented through this research has made improvements to
the analysis phase of a computer forensics investigation, there is still work to be done.
Additional research should be performed to improve the software application’s efficiency
and ease of use. The application should be able to import the data from the RDS
distribution in a more intuitive and automated fashion, rather than importing each of the
individual hash sets and supporting data files into a relational database. Additionally,
researching various database implementations (e.g., SQL, Access, etc.) and their
efficiency in looking up data could improve the overhead wait time created within the
application when comparing hash values with the RDS.

Additional functionality should be researched and implemented in future versions
of this software application. The ability to perform text analysis and queries would be
valuable features to a computer forensic investigator. Zero-byte files should also be
closely scrutinized for data streams and other concealed information. Additionally, files
characterized as unknown by the software application could be red flagged or classified
further by the investigator based upon whether the file is of evidentiary value.

This software application currently only identifies those files visible and hidden
by the operating system. It relies upon other forensic utilities that recover deleted files.
Future research could be performed so that a file recovery feature could be integrated into
the analysis provided by this application, thus doing away with the need for a separate
computer forensics application.
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The most interesting research that would elevate the usefulness of this software
application would be to implement a web-based service for accessing the most up-to-date
hash values and file profiles from the RDS. Such a web service would allow the software
application to search the RDS for matches, for example via an XML query consisting of
the MD5 hashes of files on the media being examined. The web service would return an
XML document consisting of file profiles matching the query. To maintain the
traceability and validity of hash values, such a web service must only be implemented in
cooperation with NIST.

6.5 Final Conclusions
This research explores the use of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) National Software Reference Library (NSRL) database in a hash
filtering software application that is simple, streamlined, standalone and for use by the
general public. It is the author’s hope that the ideas contained within this research will be
furthered by the students of computer forensics in the future.
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Appendices
Appendix A: MD5 Hashing Algorithm Reference Implementation
This appendix contains the following files taken from RSAREF: A Cryptographic Toolkit
for Privacy-Enhanced Mail:
global.h -- global header file
md5.h -- header file for MD5
md5c.c -- source code for MD5

The appendix also includes the following file:
mddriver.c -- test driver for MD2, MD4 and MD5

The implementation is portable and should work on many different platforms. However,
it is not difficult to optimize the implementation on particular platforms, an exercise left
to the reader. For example, on "little-endian" platforms where the lowest-addressed byte
in a 32-bit word is the least significant and there are no alignment restrictions, the call to
Decode in MD5Transform can be replaced with a typecast.
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global.h
/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants
*/
/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports
function argument prototyping.
The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
been defined with C compiler flags.
*/

#ifndef PROTOTYPES
#define PROTOTYPES 0
#endif
/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
typedef unsigned short int UINT2;
/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
typedef unsigned long int UINT4;
/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
returns an empty list.
*/
#if PROTOTYPES
#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
#else
#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
#endif
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md5.h
/* MD5.H - header file for MD5C.C
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
rights reserved.
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
or this function.
License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
mentioning or referencing the derived work.
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
without express or implied warranty of any kind.
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
documentation and/or software.
*/
/* MD5 context. */
typedef struct {
UINT4 state[4];
/* state (ABCD) */
UINT4 count[2];
/* number of bits, modulo 2^64 (lsb first) */
unsigned char buffer[64];
/* input buffer */
} MD5_CTX;
void MD5Init PROTO_LIST ((MD5_CTX *));
void MD5Update PROTO_LIST
((MD5_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int));
void MD5Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD5_CTX *));
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md5c.c
/* MD5C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 message-digest algorithm
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
rights reserved.
License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
or this function.
License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
mentioning or referencing the derived work.
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
without express or implied warranty of any kind.
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
documentation and/or software.
*/
#include "global.h"
#include "md5.h"
/* Constants for MD5Transform routine.
*/
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define

S11
S12
S13
S14
S21
S22
S23
S24
S31
S32
S33
S34
S41
S42
S43
S44

7
12
17
22
5
9
14
20
4
11
16
23
6
10
15
21

static void MD5Transform PROTO_LIST ((UINT4 [4], unsigned char [64]));
static void Encode PROTO_LIST
((unsigned char *, UINT4 *, unsigned int));
static void Decode PROTO_LIST
((UINT4 *, unsigned char *, unsigned int));
static void MD5_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, POINTER, unsigned int));
static void MD5_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int));
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static unsigned char PADDING[64] =
0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};

{
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0

/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions.
*/
#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
#define I(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | (~z)))
/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits.
*/
#define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation.
*/
#define FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
(a) += F ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
(a) += (b); \
}
#define GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
(a) += G ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
(a) += (b); \
}
#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
(a) += H ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
(a) += (b); \
}
#define II(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
(a) += I ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
(a) += (b); \
}
/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context.
*/
void MD5Init (context)
MD5_CTX *context;
/* context */
{
context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
/* Load magic initialization constants.
*/
context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
}
/* MD5 block update operation. Continues an MD5 message-digest
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operation, processing another message block, and updating the
context.
*/
void MD5Update (context, input, inputLen)
MD5_CTX *context;
/* context */
unsigned char *input;
/* input block */
unsigned int inputLen;
/* length of input block */
{
unsigned int i, index, partLen;
/* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3F);
/* Update number of bits */
if ((context->count[0] += ((UINT4)inputLen << 3))
< ((UINT4)inputLen << 3))
context->count[1]++;
context->count[1] += ((UINT4)inputLen >> 29);
partLen = 64 - index;
/* Transform as many times as possible.
*/
if (inputLen >= partLen) {
MD5_memcpy
((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)input, partLen);
MD5Transform (context->state, context->buffer);
for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64)
MD5Transform (context->state, &input[i]);
index = 0;
}
else
i = 0;
/* Buffer remaining input */
MD5_memcpy
((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)&input[i],
inputLen-i);
}
/* MD5 finalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the
the message digest and zeroizing the context.
*/
void MD5Final (digest, context)
unsigned char digest[16];
/* message digest */
MD5_CTX *context;
/* context */
{
unsigned char bits[8];
unsigned int index, padLen;
/* Save number of bits */
Encode (bits, context->count, 8);
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64.
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*/
index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index);
MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen);
/* Append length (before padding) */
MD5Update (context, bits, 8);
/* Store state in digest */
Encode (digest, context->state, 16);
/* Zeroize sensitive information.
*/
MD5_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
}
/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block.
*/
static void MD5Transform (state, block)
UINT4 state[4];
unsigned char block[64];
{
UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16];
Decode (x, block, 64);
/*
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF

Round 1 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

/* Round 2
GG (a, b,
GG (d, a,
GG (c, d,
GG (b, c,
GG (a, b,
GG (d, a,
GG (c, d,
GG (b, c,
GG (a, b,
GG (d, a,
GG (c, d,

*/
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,

x[ 0],
x[ 1],
x[ 2],
x[ 3],
x[ 4],
x[ 5],
x[ 6],
x[ 7],
x[ 8],
x[ 9],
x[10],
x[11],
x[12],
x[13],
x[14],
x[15],

S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,

0xd76aa478);
0xe8c7b756);
0x242070db);
0xc1bdceee);
0xf57c0faf);
0x4787c62a);
0xa8304613);
0xfd469501);
0x698098d8);
0x8b44f7af);
0xffff5bb1);
0x895cd7be);
0x6b901122);
0xfd987193);
0xa679438e);
0x49b40821);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

1 */
2 */
3 */
4 */
5 */
6 */
7 */
8 */
9 */
10 */
11 */
12 */
13 */
14 */
15 */
16 */

x[ 1],
x[ 6],
x[11],
x[ 0],
x[ 5],
x[10],
x[15],
x[ 4],
x[ 9],
x[14],
x[ 3],

S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,

0xf61e2562);
0xc040b340);
0x265e5a51);
0xe9b6c7aa);
0xd62f105d);
0x2441453);
0xd8a1e681);
0xe7d3fbc8);
0x21e1cde6);
0xc33707d6);
0xf4d50d87);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
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GG
GG
GG
GG
GG

(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,

c,
b,
a,
d,
c,

a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

x[ 8],
x[13],
x[ 2],
x[ 7],
x[12],

S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,

0x455a14ed);
0xa9e3e905);
0xfcefa3f8);
0x676f02d9);
0x8d2a4c8a);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

28
29
30
31
32

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/

/*
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH

Round 3 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

x[ 5],
x[ 8],
x[11],
x[14],
x[ 1],
x[ 4],
x[ 7],
x[10],
x[13],
x[ 0],
x[ 3],
x[ 6],
x[ 9],
x[12],
x[15],
x[ 2],

S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,

0xfffa3942);
0x8771f681);
0x6d9d6122);
0xfde5380c);
0xa4beea44);
0x4bdecfa9);
0xf6bb4b60);
0xbebfbc70);
0x289b7ec6);
0xeaa127fa);
0xd4ef3085);
0x4881d05);
0xd9d4d039);
0xe6db99e5);
0x1fa27cf8);
0xc4ac5665);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/

/*
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

Round 4 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

x[ 0],
x[ 7],
x[14],
x[ 5],
x[12],
x[ 3],
x[10],
x[ 1],
x[ 8],
x[15],
x[ 6],
x[13],
x[ 4],
x[11],
x[ 2],
x[ 9],

S41,
S42,
S43,
S44,
S41,
S42,
S43,
S44,
S41,
S42,
S43,
S44,
S41,
S42,
S43,
S44,

0xf4292244);
0x432aff97);
0xab9423a7);
0xfc93a039);
0x655b59c3);
0x8f0ccc92);
0xffeff47d);
0x85845dd1);
0x6fa87e4f);
0xfe2ce6e0);
0xa3014314);
0x4e0811a1);
0xf7537e82);
0xbd3af235);
0x2ad7d2bb);
0xeb86d391);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/

state[0]
state[1]
state[2]
state[3]

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

+=
+=
+=
+=

a;
b;
c;
d;

/* Zeroize sensitive information.
*/
MD5_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
}
/* Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is
a multiple of 4.
*/
static void Encode (output, input, len)
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unsigned char *output;
UINT4 *input;
unsigned int len;
{
unsigned int i, j;
for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) {
output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & 0xff);
output[j+1] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 8) & 0xff);
output[j+2] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 16) & 0xff);
output[j+3] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 24) & 0xff);
}
}
/* Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is
a multiple of 4.
*/
static void Decode (output, input, len)
UINT4 *output;
unsigned char *input;
unsigned int len;
{
unsigned int i, j;
for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4)
output[i] = ((UINT4)input[j]) | (((UINT4)input[j+1]) << 8) |
(((UINT4)input[j+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)input[j+3]) << 24);
}
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible.
*/
static void MD5_memcpy (output, input, len)
POINTER output;
POINTER input;
unsigned int len;
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
output[i] = input[i];
}
/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible.
*/
static void MD5_memset (output, value, len)
POINTER output;
int value;
unsigned int len;
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
((char *)output)[i] = (char)value;
}
mddriver.c
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/* MDDRIVER.C - test driver for MD2, MD4 and MD5
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All
rights reserved.
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
without express or implied warranty of any kind.
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
documentation and/or software.
*/
/* The following makes MD default to MD5 if it has not already been
defined with C compiler flags.
*/
#ifndef MD
#define MD MD5
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "global.h"
#if MD == 2
#include "md2.h"
#endif
#if MD == 4
#include "md4.h"
#endif
#if MD == 5
#include "md5.h"
#endif
/* Length of test block, number of test blocks.
*/
#define TEST_BLOCK_LEN 1000
#define TEST_BLOCK_COUNT 1000
static
static
static
static
static
static

void
void
void
void
void
void

MDString PROTO_LIST ((char *));
MDTimeTrial PROTO_LIST ((void));
MDTestSuite PROTO_LIST ((void));
MDFile PROTO_LIST ((char *));
MDFilter PROTO_LIST ((void));
MDPrint PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16]));

#if MD == 2
#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX
#define MDInit MD2Init
#define MDUpdate MD2Update
#define MDFinal MD2Final
#endif
#if MD == 4
#define MD_CTX MD4_CTX
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#define MDInit MD4Init
#define MDUpdate MD4Update
#define MDFinal MD4Final
#endif
#if MD == 5
#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX
#define MDInit MD5Init
#define MDUpdate MD5Update
#define MDFinal MD5Final
#endif
/* Main driver.
Arguments (may be any combination):
-sstring - digests string
-t
- runs time trial
-x
- runs test script
filename - digests file
(none)
- digests standard input
*/
int main (argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
int i;
if (argc > 1)
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == 's')
MDString (argv[i] + 2);
else if (strcmp (argv[i], "-t") == 0)
MDTimeTrial ();
else if (strcmp (argv[i], "-x") == 0)
MDTestSuite ();
else
MDFile (argv[i]);
else
MDFilter ();
return (0);
}
/* Digests a string and prints the result.
*/
static void MDString (string)
char *string;
{
MD_CTX context;
unsigned char digest[16];
unsigned int len = strlen (string);
MDInit (&context);
MDUpdate (&context, string, len);
MDFinal (digest, &context);
printf ("MD%d (\"%s\") = ", MD, string);
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MDPrint (digest);
printf ("\n");
}
/* Measures the time to digest TEST_BLOCK_COUNT TEST_BLOCK_LEN-byte
blocks.
*/
static void MDTimeTrial ()
{
MD_CTX context;
time_t endTime, startTime;
unsigned char block[TEST_BLOCK_LEN], digest[16];
unsigned int i;
printf
("MD%d time trial. Digesting %d %d-byte blocks ...", MD,
TEST_BLOCK_LEN, TEST_BLOCK_COUNT);
/* Initialize block */
for (i = 0; i < TEST_BLOCK_LEN; i++)
block[i] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
/* Start timer */
time (&startTime);
/* Digest blocks */
MDInit (&context);
for (i = 0; i < TEST_BLOCK_COUNT; i++)
MDUpdate (&context, block, TEST_BLOCK_LEN);
MDFinal (digest, &context);
/* Stop timer */
time (&endTime);
printf (" done\n");
printf ("Digest = ");
MDPrint (digest);
printf ("\nTime = %ld seconds\n", (long)(endTime-startTime));
printf
("Speed = %ld bytes/second\n",
(long)TEST_BLOCK_LEN * (long)TEST_BLOCK_COUNT/(endTime-startTime));
}
/* Digests a reference suite of strings and prints the results.
*/
static void MDTestSuite ()
{
printf ("MD%d test suite:\n", MD);
MDString ("");
MDString ("a");
MDString ("abc");
MDString ("message digest");
MDString ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
MDString
("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789");
MDString
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("1234567890123456789012345678901234567890\
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890");
}
/* Digests a file and prints the result.
*/
static void MDFile (filename)
char *filename;
{
FILE *file;
MD_CTX context;
int len;
unsigned char buffer[1024], digest[16];
if ((file = fopen (filename, "rb")) == NULL)
printf ("%s can't be opened\n", filename);
else {
MDInit (&context);
while (len = fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file))
MDUpdate (&context, buffer, len);
MDFinal (digest, &context);
fclose (file);
printf ("MD%d (%s) = ", MD, filename);
MDPrint (digest);
printf ("\n");
}
}
/* Digests the standard input and prints the result.
*/
static void MDFilter ()
{
MD_CTX context;
int len;
unsigned char buffer[16], digest[16];
MDInit (&context);
while (len = fread (buffer, 1, 16, stdin))
MDUpdate (&context, buffer, len);
MDFinal (digest, &context);
MDPrint (digest);
printf ("\n");
}
/* Prints a message digest in hexadecimal.
*/
static void MDPrint (digest)
unsigned char digest[16];
{
unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
printf ("%02x", digest[i]);
}
A.5 Test suite
The MD5 test suite (driver option "-x") should print the following
results:
MD5 test suite:
MD5 ("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
MD5 ("a") = 0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661
MD5 ("abc") = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72
MD5 ("message digest") = f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0
MD5 ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") = c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b
MD5 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789")
=
d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f
MD5
("123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456
78901234567890") = 57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a
Security Considerations
The level of security discussed in this memo is considered to be
sufficient for implementing very high security hybrid digitalsignature schemes based on MD5 and a public-key cryptosystem.
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Appendix B: Project Source Code
mainform.frm
Option Explicit
Private getdir As String
Private Declare Function SendMessageArray Lib "user32" Alias
"SendMessageA" _
(ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal wMsg As Long, _
ByVal wParam As Long, lParam As Any) As Long
Const LB_SETTABSTOPS = &H192
Dim filenum As Integer
Dim matcha As String
Dim matchb As String
Dim matchc As String
Dim matchd As String
Dim matchfound As String
Private Sub Command1_Click()
getdir = BrowseForFolder(Me, "Select A Directory", "c:\")
If Len(getdir) = 0 Then Exit Sub
Screen.MousePointer = vbHourglass
filenum = FreeFile
Print #1, Format$(Date, "mm/dd/yyyy") & " " & Format$(Hour(Now),
"00") & ":" & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & ":" & Format$(Second(Now),
"00") & " " & "Disk Analysis of " & getdir & " created. Filename: " &
Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") & Format$(Hour(Now), "00") &
Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt"
Open ("diskanalysis\" & Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") &
Format$(Hour(Now), "00") & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") &
Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt") For Output As filenum
Write #filenum, "Path", "MD5 Hash"
ShowAllFiles getdir
Screen.MousePointer = vbNormal
StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Ready"
End Sub

Private Sub ShowAllFiles(ByVal sPath As String)
Dim fso As New FileSystemObject
Dim fil As File
Dim fol As Folder
Dim sub1 As Folder
Dim md5hash As String
Dim listobj As ListItem
Set fol = fso.GetFolder(sPath)
For Each fil In fol.Files
StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Processing: " & fol & "\" & fil.Name
On Error Resume Next
md5hash = Hashmyfile(sPath & "\" & fil.Name)
Set listobj = ListView1.ListItems.add(, , fil.Name)
listobj.SubItems(1) = fil.Size
listobj.SubItems(2) = fil.Type
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listobj.SubItems(3) = fil.DateCreated
listobj.SubItems(4) = fil.DateLastAccessed
listobj.SubItems(5) = fil.DateLastModified
listobj.SubItems(6) = fil.Path
listobj.SubItems(7) = fil.Attributes
listobj.SubItems(8) = md5hash
comparehash (md5hash)
listobj.SubItems(9) = matcha
listobj.SubItems(10) = matchb
listobj.SubItems(11) = matchc
listobj.SubItems(12) = matchd
listobj.SubItems(13) = matchfound
Write #filenum, (fol & "\" & fil.Name), md5hash
Next
For Each sub1 In fol.SubFolders
ShowAllFiles sub1.Path
Next
Set fil = Nothing
Set sub1 = Nothing
Set fol = Nothing
Set fso = Nothing
End Sub
Private Sub Command2_Click()
Shell "explorer.exe " & ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6)
End Sub
Private Sub Command3_Click()
If Command3.Caption = "Hide Matches" Then
Command3.Caption = "Show Matches"
Else
If Command3.Caption = "Show Matches" Then
Command3.Caption = "Hide Matches"
End If
End If
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
Open ("logs\" & Format$(Date, "mmddyyyy") & Format$(Hour(Now), "00")
& Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & Format$(Second(Now), "00") & ".txt") For
Output As #1
Print #1, Format$(Date, "mm/dd/yyyy") & " " & Format$(Hour(Now),
"00") & ":" & Format$(Minute(Now), "00") & ":" & Format$(Second(Now),
"00") & " " & "Log File Created"
StatusBar1.Panels(1).Text = "Ready"
With Me.ListView1
.View = lvwReport
.HideSelection = False
.GridLines = True
.LabelEdit = lvwManual
.ColumnHeaders.add , "name", "Name", 4200
.ColumnHeaders.add , "size", "Size", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "type", "Type", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "datecreated", "Date Created", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "datelastaccessed", "Date Last Accessed", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "datelastmodified", "Date Last Modified", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "path", "Path", 0
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.ColumnHeaders.add , "attributes", "Attributes", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "md5hash", "MD5 Hash", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "matcha", "RDS_A", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "matchb", "RDS_B", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "matchc", "RDS_C", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "matchd", "RDS_D", 0
.ColumnHeaders.add , "matchfound", "Match", 800
End With
Set Conn1 = New ADODB.Connection
Set Rset1 = New ADODB.Recordset
Set Conn2 = New ADODB.Connection
Set Rset2 = New ADODB.Recordset
Set Conn3 = New ADODB.Connection
Set Rset3 = New ADODB.Recordset
Set Conn4 = New ADODB.Connection
Set Rset4 = New ADODB.Recordset
With Conn1
.Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0"
.ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_A.mdb"
.Open
End With
With Conn2
.Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0"
.ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_B.mdb"
.Open
End With
With Conn3
.Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0"
.ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_C.mdb"
.Open
End With
With Conn4
.Provider = "Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0"
.ConnectionString = App.Path & "\RDS_D.mdb"
.Open
End With
Rset1.CursorLocation = adUseServer
Rset2.CursorLocation = adUseServer
Rset3.CursorLocation = adUseServer
Rset4.CursorLocation = adUseServer
Rset1.Open "NSRLFile", Conn1, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly,
adCmdTableDirect
Rset2.Open "NSRLFile", Conn2, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly,
adCmdTableDirect
Rset3.Open "NSRLFile", Conn3, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly,
adCmdTableDirect
Rset4.Open "NSRLFile", Conn4, adOpenKeyset, adLockReadOnly,
adCmdTableDirect
Rset1.Index = "MD5"
Rset2.Index = "MD5"
Rset3.Index = "MD5"
Rset4.Index = "MD5"
Dim LBTab(1) As Long
LBTab(0) = 30
LBTab(1) = 60
End Sub
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Private Sub ListView1_Click()
Dim lsFileName As String
Dim liX As Integer
Dim HexText As String
Dim attributeval As Integer
Dim attributetext As String
attributetext = ""
outpath = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6)
attributeval = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(7)
If attributeval And &H20 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Archive "
End If
If attributeval And &H800 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Compressed "
End If
If attributeval And &H10 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Directory "
End If
If attributeval And &H2 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Hidden "
End If
If attributeval And &H80 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Normal "
End If
If attributeval And &H1 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "ReadOnly "
End If
If attributeval And &H4 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "System "
End If
If attributeval And &H100 Then
attributetext = attributetext & "Temporary "
End If
outattributes = attributetext
outsize = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(1)
outtype = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(2)
outcreated = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(3)
outaccessed = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(4)
outmodified = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(5)
outhash = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(8)
outa = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(9)
outb = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(10)
outc = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(11)
outd = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(12)
On Error GoTo ErrAboardLoad
lsFileName = ListView1.SelectedItem.SubItems(6)
On Error GoTo 0
LstHexView.Visible = False
On Error GoTo ErrLoadFile
liX = FreeFile
Open lsFileName For Binary Access Read As #liX
HexText = Space$(LOF(liX) + 16)
Get #liX, , HexText
Close #liX
On Error GoTo 0
LstHexView.ListItems.Clear
FileToHex (HexText)
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LstHexView.Visible = True
GoTo ErrCont
ErrAboardLoad:
GoTo ErrCont
ErrLoadFile:
MsgBox "File is too large..."
GoTo ErrCont
ErrCont:
On Error GoTo 0
End Sub
Private Sub comparehash(hashval As String)
Dim fname As String
Dim outhash As String
matcha = ""
matchb = ""
matchc = ""
matchd = ""
matchfound = ""
Rset1.Seek hashval
If Not Rset1.EOF Then
fname = Rset1!FileName
outhash = Rset1!MD5
matcha = outhash & " " & fname
matchfound = "X"
Else
matcha = ""
End If
Rset2.Seek hashval
If Not Rset2.EOF Then
fname = Rset2!FileName
outhash = Rset2!MD5
matchb = outhash & " " & fname
matchfound = "X"
Else
matchb = ""
End If
Rset3.Seek hashval
If Not Rset3.EOF Then
fname = Rset3!FileName
outhash = Rset3!MD5
matchc = outhash & " " & fname
matchfound = "X"
Else
matchc = ""
End If
Rset4.Seek hashval
If Not Rset4.EOF Then
fname = Rset4!FileName
outhash = Rset4!MD5
matchd = outhash & " " & fname
matchfound = "X"
Else
matchd = ""
End If
End Sub
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hexedit.bas
‘
‘
‘

Open source code adapted within this module made freely available by
Michael Werren at http://www.planetsourcecode.com/vb/scripts/
ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=13898&lngWId=1

Option Explicit
Function WriteHex(Cnt As Integer, Val As String) As String
WriteHex = String(Cnt, Val)
End Function
Sub AddHexLine(HexIndex As String, HexText As String, AsciiText As
String)
Dim itmx As ListItem
Set itmx = Form1.LstHexView.ListItems.add
itmx.Text = HexIndex
itmx.SubItems(1) = HexText
itmx.SubItems(2) = AsciiText
End Sub
Sub FileToHex(TransText As String)
Dim HexText As String
Dim lsVal As String
Dim lsOrgText As String
Dim lsHexCode As String
Dim lsHexLine As String
Dim lsHexIndex As String
Dim liHexIndex As Long
Dim liVal As Integer
Dim liPointer As Integer
Dim liX As Long
Dim liProcent As Integer
Dim liProcentOld As Integer
HexText = TransText
Screen.MousePointer = vbHourglass
liPointer = 1
liHexIndex = 0
For liX = 1 To Len(HexText)
If liPointer <= 16 Then
liPointer = liPointer + 1
lsVal = Mid(HexText, liX, 1)
liVal = Asc(lsVal)
lsHexCode = Hex(liVal)
If Len(lsHexCode) < 2 Then
lsHexCode = "0" + lsHexCode
End If
If liPointer <= 16 Then
If liPointer <> 9 Then
lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode + "."
Else
lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode + " "
End If
Else
lsHexLine = lsHexLine + lsHexCode
' Enum the translation in procent
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liProcentOld = liProcent
liProcent = liX * 100 \ Len(HexText)
If liProcent <> liProcentOld Then
DispInfo "Translate the file " + Str(liProcent) + "%"
End If
End If
If Asc(lsVal) = 0 Then
lsOrgText = lsOrgText + "."
Else
lsOrgText = lsOrgText + lsVal
End If
Else
lsHexIndex = WriteHex(8 - Len(Hex(liHexIndex)), "0") +
Hex(liHexIndex)
AddHexLine lsHexIndex, lsHexLine, lsOrgText
liPointer = 1
liHexIndex = liHexIndex + 16
lsHexLine = ""
lsOrgText = ""
liX = liX - 1
End If
Next liX
If lsHexLine <> "" Then
If Mid(lsHexLine, Len(lsHexLine), 1) = "." Then
lsHexLine = Mid(lsHexLine, 1, Len(lsHexLine) - 1)
End If
lsHexIndex = WriteHex(8 - Len(Hex(liHexIndex)), "0") +
Hex(liHexIndex)
AddHexLine lsHexIndex, lsHexLine, lsOrgText
End If
DispInfo ""
Screen.MousePointer = vbDefault
End Sub
Sub DispInfo(Text As String)
DoEvents
End Sub
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md5file.bas
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'

The MD5 algorithm is defined in RFC1321.
The basic C code implementing the algorithm is derived
from that in the RFC and is covered by the following
copyright: Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc.
Created 1991. All rights reserved.
License to copy and use this
that it is identified as the
Message-Digest Algorithm" in
referencing this software or

software is granted provided
"RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5
all material mentioning or
this function.

License is also granted to make and use derivative works
provided that such works are identified as "derived from
the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"
in all material mentioning or referencing the derived
work.
RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations
concerning either the merchantability of this software or
the suitability of this software for any particular
purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
warranty of any kind.
These notices must be retained in any copies of any part
of this documentation and/or software.

Private Declare Sub MDFile Lib "md5file.dll" (ByVal outmd As String,
ByVal outstring As String)
Public Function Hashmyfile(outmd As String) As String
Dim outstring As String * 32
outstring = Space(32)
MDFile outmd, outstring
Hashmyfile = r
End Function
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filesearch.bas
‘
‘
‘

Open source code adapted within this module made freely available by
Serge Lachapelle at http://www.planetsourcecode.com/vb/scripts/
ShowCode.asp?txtCodeId=49326&lngWid=-10

Option Explicit
Private
Private
Private
Private

Const
Const
Const
Const

BIF_STATUSTEXT = &H4&
BIF_RETURNONLYFSDIRS = 1
BIF_DONTGOBELOWDOMAIN = 2
MAX_PATH = 260

Private
Private
Private
Private
Private

Const
Const
Const
Const
Const

WM_USER = &H400
BFFM_INITIALIZED = 1
BFFM_SELCHANGED = 2
BFFM_SETSTATUSTEXT = (WM_USER + 100)
BFFM_SETSELECTION = (WM_USER + 102)

Private Declare Function SendMessage Lib "user32" Alias "SendMessageA"
(ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal wMsg As Long, ByVal wParam As Long, ByVal
lParam As String) As Long
Private Declare Function SHBrowseForFolder Lib "shell32" (lpbi As
BrowseInfo) As Long
Private Declare Function SHGetPathFromIDList Lib "shell32" (ByVal
pidList As Long, ByVal lpBuffer As String) As Long
Private Declare Function lstrcat Lib "kernel32" Alias "lstrcatA" (ByVal
lpString1 As String, ByVal lpString2 As String) As Long
Private Type BrowseInfo
hWndOwner
As Long
pIDLRoot
As Long
pszDisplayName As Long
lpszTitle
As Long
ulFlags
As Long
lpfnCallback
As Long
lParam
As Long
iImage
As Long
End Type
Private m_CurrentDirectory As String
'

'The current directory

Public Function BrowseForFolder(owner As Form, Title As String,
StartDir As String) As String
'Opens a Treeview control that displays the directories in a computer
Dim lpIDList As Long
Dim szTitle As String
Dim sBuffer As String
Dim tBrowseInfo As BrowseInfo
m_CurrentDirectory = StartDir & vbNullChar
szTitle = Title
With tBrowseInfo
.hWndOwner = owner.hWnd
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.lpszTitle = lstrcat(szTitle, "")
.ulFlags = BIF_RETURNONLYFSDIRS + BIF_DONTGOBELOWDOMAIN +
BIF_STATUSTEXT
.lpfnCallback = GetAddressofFunction(AddressOf BrowseCallbackProc)
'get address of function.
End With
lpIDList = SHBrowseForFolder(tBrowseInfo)
If (lpIDList) Then
sBuffer = Space(MAX_PATH)
SHGetPathFromIDList lpIDList, sBuffer
sBuffer = Left(sBuffer, InStr(sBuffer, vbNullChar) - 1)
BrowseForFolder = sBuffer
Else
BrowseForFolder = ""
End If
End Function
Private Function BrowseCallbackProc(ByVal hWnd As Long, ByVal uMsg As
Long, ByVal lp As Long, ByVal pData As Long) As Long
Dim lpIDList As Long
Dim ret As Long
Dim sBuffer As String
On Error Resume Next

'Sugested by MS to prevent an error from
'propagating back into the calling process.

Select Case uMsg
Case BFFM_INITIALIZED
Call SendMessage(hWnd, BFFM_SETSELECTION, 1, m_CurrentDirectory)
Case BFFM_SELCHANGED
sBuffer = Space(MAX_PATH)
ret = SHGetPathFromIDList(lp, sBuffer)
If ret = 1 Then
Call SendMessage(hWnd, BFFM_SETSTATUSTEXT, 0, sBuffer)
End If
End Select
BrowseCallbackProc = 0
End Function
' This function allows you to assign a function pointer to a variable.
Private Function GetAddressofFunction(add As Long) As Long
GetAddressofFunction = add
End Function
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dbconnect.bas
Public Conn1 As ADODB.Connection
Public Rset1 As ADODB.Recordset
Public Conn2 As ADODB.Connection
Public Rset2 As ADODB.Recordset
Public Conn3 As ADODB.Connection
Public Rset3 As ADODB.Recordset
Public Conn4 As ADODB.Connection
Public Rset4 As ADODB.Recordset
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